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The Progress of Science and the Useful Arts:




Patent-Eligible Subject-Matter in Canada
The law of patent-eligible subject-matter in Canada has become badly mud-
dled. There has been repeated confusion of subject-matter issues with non-subject-
matter issues such as novelty, obviousness, and utility. There has also been re-
peated confusion within the following group of issues pertaining to whether sub-
ject-matter is patent-eligible: whether a claim is for a mere idea or aggregation or
for a patentable invention; whether claimed subject-matter falls within science and
the useful arts; and whether claimed subject-matter falls within the statutory classes
listed in the definition of “invention”. Echoes of older UK-based cases, relating to
statutory provisions found in England, but not in Canada, continue to entangle sub-
ject-matter inquiries under the Canadian Patent Act.
The structure of the Patent Act is based on logical, sound principles that have
not changed in two centuries. The statute itself establishes an order of steps that, if
followed, would resolve many controversial issues. That order starts with the re-
quirement for subject-matter in ss 27(4) and 27(3), followed by consideration of the
definition of “invention” in s 2. The Patent Act itself requires subject-matter first
qualify as an art or science, where art means “useful art”, a point apparently not
presented or discussed in recent case law.
The significance of the recent Amazon.com case is not its effect on the particu-
lar applicant, but its treatment of, and apparent divergence from, sound principles
of patent law. It had been hoped that Amazon.com might be an opportunity to set
the law back on a straight course. In the end, the Federal Court of Appeal did not
answer the question asked of it, and appears not to have reduced the confusion of
previous case law.
Closer adherence to the provisions of the Act, to the history and purpose of the
Act, and to long-standing, sound, fundamental patent principles, might go a great
distance toward untangling the law of patent-eligible subject-matter in Canada.
Abbreviations
Throughout this paper abbreviations have the following meanings:
(a) SCC — Supreme Court of Canada
(b) FCA — Federal Court of Appeal
* Professional Engineer, Barrister & Solicitor, Patent and Trademark Agent, Bereskin &
Parr, Toronto.
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(c) FC — Federal Court
(d) PAB — Patent Appeal Board
(e) USSC — United States Supreme Court
(f) Fed Cir — United State Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit
(g) CCPA — US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(h) AMFL — Appellant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law
(i) RMFL — Respondent’s Memorandum of Fact and Law
(j) IMFL — Interveners’ Memorandum of Fact and Law
The PAB — Explanatory Note
In Canada, review of a final rejection by an Examiner is undertaken by the
Patent Appeal Board. The PAB is appointed by the Commissioner and exists to aid
the Commissioner in deciding whether finally to reject a case under s 40 of the
Patent Act. Although the PAB has no formal or explicit statutory existence, it has
existed for many years, and its recommendations invariably become the decisions
of the Commissioner.
I. INTRODUCTION
(a) The Context of Amazon.com
In Canada, a patent may only be granted in respect of an invention meeting the
requirements of patent-eligible subject-matter as mandated by the Patent Act. Al-
though only a few cases in the last half century have considered patent eligibility of
subject-matter, the law has become badly tangled. The need for reconsideration has
been heightened by controversy arising from the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court (USSC) in Diamond v Chakrabarty,1 of the Court of Appeal for the
Federal Circuit (Fed Cir) in State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial
Group Inc,2 and more recently of the USSC in Bilski v Kappos.3 Determination of
the boundaries of patent-eligible subject-matter, and, in particular, as pertaining to
software and business methods, under Canadian law has been an issue of signifi-
cant commercial importance.
In that light, the appeal in Amazon.com Inc, Re had been eagerly awaited.
There are many questions raised by the 24 November 2011 Federal Court of Ap-
peal (FCA) decision4 allowing the appeal of the AG from the decision of the Fed-
eral Court (FC).5 The respondent, Amazon.com, appeared to prevail on every issue
of law, and yet the result would have sent Amazon.com back where it started more
than ten years ago. In a rather startling reversal of fortune, the Commissioner then
allowed, without amendment, the very same claims against which the Commis-
1 Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 100 S Ct 2204 (1980) [Diamond].
2 State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group Inc, 149 F 3d 1368, Rich J
(Fed Cir, 1998) [State Street Bank].
3 Bilski v Kappos, 130 S Ct 3218, 177 L Ed 2d 792 (2010) [Bilski].
4 Amazon.com Inc, Re, 2011 FCA 328, 97 CPR (4th) 171 [Amazon, FCA].
5 2010 FC 1011, 86 CPR (4th) 321 [Amazon, FC].
MISADVENTURES ON PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT-MATTER   131
sioner had appealed.6 In the end, the outcome in the FCA, and the subsequent al-
lowance have come as a great disappointment. A golden opportunity to untangle
the law appears to have been lost.
This paper provides a discussion of the history of issues related to interpreta-
tion of the definition of “subject-matter” and “invention” in the Patent Act; a dis-
cussion of case law leading up to Amazon.com, a discussion of the FCA decision in
Amazon.com and the problems arising from it, and provides some comment on a
logical framework based on patent fundamentals for addressing the continuing
problems with interpretation of the definition of “invention”.
(b) Statutory Subject-Matter under the Patent Act
The fundamental bargain of the Patent Act is the grant of the claim required
by s 27(4) in return for the description in s 27(3). The requirement for patent-eligi-
ble subject-matter is found at the heart of that bargain: 
27. (4) The specification must end with a claim or claims defining distinctly
and in explicit terms the subject-matter of the invention for which an exclu-
sive property or privilege is sought.7 (Emphasis added.)
It is the subject-matter of the invention, and it is defined by the claim — and
nothing else. It cannot be defined by anything else because, as noted, patents exist
only by statute, and the only invention pertinent to the patent grant is the one
claimed as required by the statute.
The other side of the bargain is established by s 27(3), which requires, inter
alia: 
27. (3) The specification of an invention must
. . .
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of
constructing, making compounding or using a machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science
to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely connected,
to make, compound, construct or use it; . . .8
First, the words “an invention” can only be “the invention” of the claim of s
27(4). The alternative is to imply that the Act creates a requirement for a claim for
one invention, and a description of something else. Second, s 27(3) establishes the
statutory requirement that the invention of the claim must pertain to an art or sci-
ence. The meaning of “art or science” is discussed below. The same requirement of
“art or science” is found in s 28.3: 
28.3 The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a patent in
Canada must be subject-matter that would not have been obvious on the
claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains,
6 CA 2,246,933 Notice of Allowance 23 December 2011; Final Fee paid 28 December;
Issued 17 January 2012.
7 Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4, s 27(4).
8 Ibid, s 27(3).
132   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
having regard to . . .9 (Emphasis added.)
The permissible statutory classes of that “art or science” of the “invention” are
found in the definition of invention in s 2 of the Patent Act, which currently reads
as follows: 
2. Definitions — In this Act, except as otherwise provided,
. . . “invention” means any new and useful art, process, machine, manufac-
ture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any
art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.10
Thus the fundamental underlying bargain of the Patent Act is the exchange of
a grant of a claim for the subject-matter of an invention in “art or science” falling
within one of the statutory classes, in return for which a detailed description is
provided in the disclosure.11 It is an explicit, unavoidable, statutory requirement. It
establishes two questions: (1) is the subject-matter “art or science”; and, if so, (2)
does it fall within one of the statutory classes? The first question is a pre-requisite
to the second question.
(c) The Meaning of “Art or Science”
When looking for the meaning of “art or science”, it may be helpful to con-
sider the history of the statutory provisions in Canada. The first post-Confederation
Patent Act of 1869 was based on earlier statutes in Upper Canada and Lower Can-
ada, which, in turn, were copied in relevant parts nearly word-for-word from US
law. As in Canada, US patents exist only by statute. To that end, Article 1, section
8 of the US Constitution provides: 
Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the progress of Science and
the useful Arts by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their writings and discoveries.12 (Emphasis added.)
The first US Patent Act, 1790, Ch 7, 1 Stat 109-112 (10 April 1790) provided:
Chapter VII. — An Act to promote the progress
of useful Arts
1. Be it enacted . . . That upon the petition of any person . . . setting forth,
that he . . . hath . . . invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, en-
gine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be
lawful to and for the Secretary of State, [etc.] . . ., if they shall deem the
invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause letters pat-
ent to be made out in the name of the United States, . . . (Emphasis added.)
9 Ibid, s 28.3.
10 Ibid, s 2.
11 Consolboard Inc v MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd, [1981] 1 SCR 504 at 517
per Dickson J See also Whirlpool Corp v Camco Inc, 2000 SCC 67, [2000] 2 SCR
1067, [2000] SCJ No 68, ¶37. See also Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd,
[1999] 1 SCR 142, per Binnie J at para 46.
12 US Const art I, §8, cl 8.
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Sec 1 was amended by the Patent Act of 1793, Ch 11, 1 Stat 318-323 (21
February 1793), Ch 11: 
1. Be it enacted . . . That when any person . . ., shall allege that he or they
have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manu-
facture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application,
and shall present a petition . . ., it shall and may be lawful . . ., to cause
letters patent to be made out . . ., reciting the allegations and suggestions of
the said petition, and giving a short description of the said invention or
discovery.
The US Act of 1790 had required examination, but the duty of examination
had fallen on the high officials of state, who lacked the administrative resources to
cope with the task. Thus the 1793 Act established a registration system in which the
verification of compliance would fall upon the courts. That decision was reversed
in the great patent reform of 1836, which introduced a system of substantive exami-
nation in the US Patent Office. The definition of the statutory classes was carried
over from the Statute of 1793: 
US Patent Act of 1836, Ch 357, 5 Stat 117 (4 July 1836)
CHAP CCCLVII. — An Act to promote the progress of useful arts, and to
repeal all acts and parts of acts heretofore made for that purpose.
§(a) — Be it enacted . . . 
6. And be it further enacted, That any person or persons
having discovered or invented any new and useful art, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, not known or used by others
before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not,
at the time of his application for a patent, in public use or
on sale, with his consent or allowance, as the inventor or
discoverer; and shall desire to obtain an exclusive property
therein, may make application. . . .
But before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such
new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written
description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner
and process of making, constructing, using, and com-
pounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms,
avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person
skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, com-
pound, and use the same; and in case of any machine, he
shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in
which he has contemplated the application of that principle
or character by which it may be distinguished from other
inventions; and shall particularly specify and point out the
part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his
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own invention or discovery. . . . (Emphasis added.)13
The word “art” was eventually replaced by the word “process” in the Patent
Act amendment of 1952, yielding the current form of 35 USC 101: 
35 USC 101: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.14
Process, itself, is defined in 35 USC 100(b): The term “process” means pro-
cess, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufac-
ture, composition of matter, or material.
The written description requirement of ss 27(3)(b) of the Canadian Patent Act
is nearly word-for-word that of s 6, para 2 of the US Act of 1836, whence it
originates. Similarly, the statutory classes of the definition of “invention” in s 2 of
the Canadian Act is very nearly word-for-word that of s 6, para 1 of the US Act,
which is unchanged from the US Act of 1793.
In the 1836 requirement for written description, the “art or science” can only
be the “Science and the useful Arts” of the US Constitution: there would be no
point having a requirement for a description of an “art” for which Congress was not
constitutionally competent to grant a patent. Just as with the definition of the statu-
tory classes, “art” cannot have greater scope than the “useful Arts”.
(d) The Meaning of “Science” — US Constitution and Copyright
In the US Constitution, the objective is progress of “Science and the useful
Arts”. Congress therefore lacks the power to grant patents for anything that is
neither “Science” nor a “useful Art”. The 1790 meaning of the term “Science” has
been interpreted to mean today, roughly, “anything but science”; “discoveries”
means “inventions”, and not discoveries (of e.g., natural laws); and “useful Arts”
means anything that is technological or scientific.15 This is explained in Applica-
tion of Bergy:16
Scholars who have studied this provision, its origins, and its subsequent his-
tory, have, from time to time, pointed out that it is really two grants of
power rolled into one; first, to establish a copyright system and, second, to
establish a patent system. . . . Their conclusions have been that the constitu-
tionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their dis-
coveries is the promotion of progress in the “useful Arts,” rather than in
science. In enacting the 1952 Patent Act, both houses of Congress adopted
13 The US wording was amended in 1952 to “in the art to which it pertains”. See 35 USC
112, first para
14 Inventions Patentable, 35 USC §101 (2006).
15 In re Comiskey, 499 F 3d 1365 (Fed Cir, 2007) at 1374–75: “The Constitution explic-
itly limited patentability to the national purpose of advancing the useful arts — the pro-
cess today called technological innovation.” Paulik v Rizkalla, 760 F 2d 1270 (Fed Cir,
1985) at 1276: “The exclusive right, constitutionally derived, was for the national pur-
pose of advancing the useful arts — the process today called technological innovation.”
[Comiskey].
16 Application of Bergy, 596 F 2d 952 (Cust & Pat App, 1979) at 958, 959 [Bergy].
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in their reports this construction of the Constitution in identical words, as
follows: 
The background, the balanced construction, and the usage
current then and later, indicate that the constitutional provi-
sion is really two provisions merged into one. The purpose
of the first provision is to promote the progress of science
by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right
to their writings, the word “science” in this connection hav-
ing the meaning of knowledge in general, which is one of
its meanings today. The other provision is that Congress
has the power to promote the progress of useful arts by se-
curing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries. The first patent law and all patent laws up
to a much later period were entitled “Acts to promote the
progress of useful arts.” (Emphasis ours.)
It is to be observed that the Constitutional clause . . . merely empowered
Congress, if it elected to do so, to secure to inventors an “exclusive right”
for an unstated “limited” time for the stated purpose of promoting useful
arts. We have previously pointed out that the present day equivalent of the
term “useful arts” employed by the Founding Fathers is “technological
arts.” (Internal citation omitted.)
Both old and relatively new US case law limits patentability to the “useful
Arts”.17, 18 In terms of contemporary understanding, in which matters of science
and applied science plainly fall within the Patent Act, the term “useful Arts” appar-
ently encompasses both (i) what used to be called “natural science”; and (b) the
useful arts. Despite the enthusiasm of various courts and authors19 for equating
“useful Art” with “technological art”, that equivalence may not be exact.
First, the conclusion that “Science” in the US Constitution supports only Cop-
yright does not square with the written description requirement in s 6 of the 1836
Act which refers to “the art or science to which it appertains”. Thus, whatever may
have been thought in 1952, “science” in 1790 must have included scientific inquiry,
17 Dolbear v American Bell Tel Co, 126 US 1 (1888) at 533: “[I]t is only the useful
arts — arts which may be used to advantage — that can be made the subject of a pat-
ent.” This would seem to imply that something which is “science” but not a useful art,
is not patent eligible.
18 Application of Waldbaum, 457 F 2d 997 (Cust & Pat App, 1972) per Baldwin J at
1003: “With regard to the “mental steps” rejection, whether appellant’s process is a
“statutory” invention depends on whether it is within the “technological arts.” The
phrase “technological arts,” as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase “useful
arts” as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”
19 See: Lutz, “Patents and Science”, 18 Geo Wash LR 50 (1949-1950); Coulter, “The
Field of the Statutory Arts”, 34 J Pat Off Soc 487 (1952); Rich, “Principles of Patenta-
bility”, 28 Geo Wash LR 393 (1959-1960). See also Pollack, “Multiple Unconstitution-
ality of Business Method Patents” 28 Rutgers Comp & Tech LJ 61 (2002); Seidel, “The
Constitution and a Standard of Patentability”, 48 J Pat Off Soc 5 (1966); Walterscheid,
“The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents, (Part 1)”, 76 J Pat
Off Soc 697 (1994).
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at least as early as s 6 of the 1836 Act, and at least as late as 1908.20 It would be
odd, too, if the 1836 “art or science” description requirement was only for general
knowledge or learning, when the point of the written description is to provide pre-
cise, substantive knowledge about the particular invention for which a patent is
sought.
Second, if “Science” equated only to “Learning” or “Knowledge” generally, it
is odd the first US Copyright Act is entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning” (Copyright Act of 31 May 1790), following the British Copyright Act of
1709 (the “Statute of Anne”) “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning”.21 If the
Act of 1790 was drafted contemporaneously with the US Constitution, why did the
Constitution not refer to “The Progress of Learning and the useful Arts”, for exam-
ple? It implies that “Science” had then only the single, general, meaning of “Learn-
ing” or “Knowledge” and did not then have, or include, a second meaning, the
current meaning, namely that of “natural science” or of scientific inquiry.
Third, it is anomalous that the term “Science”, even if it only has the meaning
of “Knowledge” or “Learning” is used as a basis for finding Copyright, in which
the contemporary right is predominantly, if not exclusively, about form of expres-
sion of creative works, and which expressly excludes any monopoly on underlying
facts or function — i.e., the very stuff of learning or knowledge — yet does not
extend to patents, which are not about form but about substantive knowledge: what
the invention is, and how to practice it.
Although US case law, like Bergy, maps “technological arts” onto “useful
Arts”, there are “arts” that encompass patent-eligible subject-matter that would not
be thought colloquially to be “technology”. For example, there is no answer in the
case law of where “biology” ends, and “biotechnology” starts, or where “science”
ends, and “applied science” begins. There is no explanation why “Science” does
not include “science”, or why the original meaning did not capture more than
merely general knowledge or learning. The USSC has ruled that Congress has al-
20 For over a hundred years the USSC interpreted “art or science” in s 6 without any
suggestion that “science” in s 6 was not “Science” in the Constitution. See: Continental
Paper Bag Co v Eastern Paper Bag Co, 210 US 405 (1908) — “The foundation of the
argument of the petitioner is, [. . .], the policy of the patent laws executing the purpose
of the Constitution of the United States to promote the progress of science and useful
arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to their respective
discoveries. The right which a patentee receives does not need much further explana-
tion. We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from the beginning that
the sciences and the useful arts could be best advanced by giving an exclusive right to
an inventor.” See also: Seymour v Osborne, 78 US 516 (1870); Cohn v US Corset Co,
93 US 366 (1876); Downton v Yaeger Milling Co, 108 US 466 (1883); Bene v Jeantet,
129 US 683 (1889); Consolidated Electric Light Co v McKeesport Light Co, 159 US
465 (1895); General Electric Co v Wabash Appliance Corporation, 304 US 364
(1938); Great Atlantic & Pac Tea Co v Supermarket Equipment Corp, 340 US 147
(1950).
21 Full title: “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Authors or purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned”.
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most infinite latitude to decide how best to promote “Science”.22 Nonetheless, to
conclude that “Science” necessarily does not include “natural science” remains
odd. Further, if “technological arts” and “useful Arts” are equivalent, then the origi-
nal language is still good. If not equivalent, then “technological Arts” is merely an
inaccurate gloss. As seen herein, unwise glosses have been the source of trouble in
the patent-eligible subject-matter cases, whether in Canada, the US, or the UK and
Commonwealth. Far better to omit the gloss, and to make a better effort to under-
stand the sound concepts and principles of the original language instead.
The original wording “Science and the useful Arts”, stripped of the awkward
overlay of Copyright, and with the present-day understanding of Science, captures
the idea much better that patentable subject-matter can range from work with a very
high proportion of theoretical content to work with almost no theoretical content at
all, and, in the continuum of science there is no bright line of demarcation. Whether
it equates exactly to “technological arts” is irrelevant. What matters is that it clearly
excludes things that are not “science and the useful arts”.
(e) The Plural Meanings of “Useful” and “Art”
The choice of the term “useful Arts” in the US Constitution was a response to
then-current problems with the need to stretch interpretation of “the sole working
or making of any manner of new manufactures” under the British Statute of Mo-
nopolies (21 Jac 1, c 3, s 6) to include methods and processes,23 exemplified by the
Watt steam engine cases.24 There have always been arts that do not fall within the
scope of the Patent Act, in both the British and US understandings of patents —
e.g., the “fine arts” or the “liberal arts”. Although raised in earlier US Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) cases, the Constitutional requirement seems
to have been overlooked by the majority in the USSC in the exuberance of
Chakrabarty. It is not addressed by five judges in Bilski. It is, however, the corner-
stone of the opinion of four judges in Bilski,25 who, on this point, were not a minor-
ity. Rather, on this point the number of judges holding that there was a Constitu-
tional bar to subject-matter not falling within the “useful arts” was equal to the
number of judges who denied that there was a bar to methods of doing business
22 See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003), a case in which the plaintiff challenged the
right of Congress to extend Copyright (and implicitly, Patent) term.
23 In re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943, 88 USPQ 2d 1385 (Fed Cir 2008), p 5 of Linn opinion.
24 Boulton & Watt v Bull (1795), 2 H Bl 463, 126 ER 651; Hornblower v Boulton (1799),
8 Term Rep 95.
25 Bilski, supra note 3 per Stevens J:
“The Constitutionally mandated purpose and function of the patent
laws bolster the conclusion that methods of doing business are not
processs under s 101.” . . .
“The Constitution allows Congress to issue patents “[t]o promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts,” Art I, s 8, cl 8. This clause is both a grant
of power and a limitation Graham, 383 US at 5. . . . “This is the stan-
dard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is
in this light that patent validity “requires reference to [the] standard
written into the Constitution.”
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under 35 USC 101 — itself a slightly different question.26 As seen, the US statutes
referred only to the promotion of the “useful arts”, which apparently includes all of
what would be understood today as science. The statutes of 1790, 1793 and 1836
were explicitly directed toward “the progress of the useful arts”.
Further, the US statute of 1790 refers first to “any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein . . .”, and then subse-
quently indicates that the invention or discovery must be “sufficiently useful and
important”. The word “useful” has been used in two different ways. First, useful
modifies only “art”. It does not modify “manufacture, engine, machine or device”.
We know that useful only modifies art in the first instance because of the subse-
quent requirement that the invention be sufficiently useful. The first instance distin-
guishes “useful art” from any “art” more generally, consistent with the US Consti-
tution. Here useful is unrelated to the utility of any specific invention. The second
useful established the requirement of utility specific to the particular invention for
which a patent is sought.
The phrasing in the 1790 Act was problematic because it established no basis
upon which to assess whether an invention was “sufficiently” useful, or “suffi-
ciently” important. Use of the modifier “sufficiently” in respect of the word “use-
ful” achieved very little. First, in ends to be achieved by inventive means, useful-
ness tends to be a binary state issue: either something is useful, or it is not. Second,
the word “important” was itself uncertain even without the addition of the equally
indefinite modifier “sufficiently”. Thus, in the 1793 Act, there is no requirement
that the invention be important, let alone sufficiently important, and the require-
ment that it be sufficiently useful was eliminated: any usefulness was sufficient.
In the 1790 Act, section 1 also required that the invention not be “previously
known or used”, a requirement that followed the listing of the statutory classes. In
the 1793 Act, this requirement has been transformed to “not known or used before
the application”. The open-ended “previously known or used” in the 1790 Act is a
requirement for novelty. The 1793 “not known or used before the application” is an
administrative requirement placing a statutory bar on disclosure prior to applica-
tion. The 1793 Act does not dispense with novelty, but rather, by adding the word
“new” re-locates it to precede, rather than follow, the statutory classes.
When the word “new” was introduced to precede “useful”, the word “and”
was also added, giving “new and useful”, thus changing the emphasis. However,
while it was intentional that inventions be new, it is not clear that it was intended to
change the meaning of useful from (a) permitting patents for inventions in the “use-
ful arts”, to (b) permitting patents for invention in any art, so long as the invention
was useful. I.e., the invention might be useful (in the sense of utility), or that the art
might be useful (in the sense of industrial), or both. If, by addition of “and” it was
attempting to say that any art is patentable if new and useful, it would have been
ultra vires as no longer limiting inventions to the “useful Arts” of the US Constitu-
26 Scalia J joined the others in holding that the Bilski claims were abstract under 35 USC
101, but declined to join in Part II-B-2 of the Kennedy opinion. He similarly joined
only in Part II of the concurring opinion of Breyer J thus leaving the court evenly
divided on whether methods of conducting business were constitutionally excluded
from patentability. Scalia J expressed no opinion on whether methods of doing busi-
ness were also excluded as a class either under s 101 or constitutionally.
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tion. In his landmark treatise, Robinson side-stepped the confusion of the two
meanings by implicitly equating “useful art” with “industrial art”,27 and then re-
quiring that the industrial art be useful in the sense of having specific utility. While
there is discussion of art in Canadian case law, e.g., in Shell Oil,28 whether a “use”
is an art; and in the Refrigerating Equipment29 case as to whether a method or a
process is an art, there is little or no discussion of what constitutes a “useful art”.
A “new and useful machine” or a “new and useful manufacture” is quite logi-
cal and consistent. The phrase might have been “any new and useful machine, man-
ufacture, or useful art, [etc.]” except that indicating that a “useful art” is useful
would seem redundant, unless the double meaning is understood: that the invention
belongs in the useful arts and has utility specific to the particular invention. The
problem is that in the 1793 wording “any new and useful art”, the word “useful”
must now carry both meanings — the general meaning of “useful arts”, and the
particular meaning of utility specific to one invention. Unhelpfully, the confusing
double meaning only applies to one statutory class, i.e., the useful arts, and not to
the classes of machines, manufactures and compositions of matter, which are either
science or, redundantly, which fall within the penumbra of the useful arts anyway.
Similarly, “art” has multiple meanings. “Art” means, first, “useful art”. Con-
gress had no constitutional power to make it otherwise: “Shoemaking is one of the
useful arts”. Art has a second meaning, namely that of the statutory class as distin-
guished from machine, apparatus or composition of matter: “My method of shoe-
making falls in the statutory class of being an “art”, not a “machine”. “Art” has a
third meaning, that of the specific art of a particular claim: “I claim the art of mak-
ing a shoe, comprising the steps of . . .” Finally art has a fourth meaning, namely
that of “prior art”. In the first instance, being a “useful art” is a fundamental pre-
requisite for patent eligibility. In the second instance, “art” defines a statutory class
pigeon-hole. In the third instance, “art” pertains to a specific claim and its ele-
ments. In the fourth instance, it is used in the sense of material for comparison in
assessing novelty and obviousness. Which meaning applies depends on context.
The plural meanings of “useful” and “art” have led to confusion.
(f) Promotion of the Progress of the Useful Arts Comes to Canada
The first Canadian Patent statutes were those of Lower Canada and Upper
Canada respectively: 4 Geo IV, c 25 (1823), LC “An Act to promote the progress of
useful arts in the Province” and 7 Geo IV, c 5 (1826) UC “An Act to encourage the
progress of the useful arts within this Province”. Clearly, given the titles of the two
Acts, it cannot now rationally be argued that the Canadas adopted the US provi-
sions with any different purpose in mind than the US purpose of promotion of the
27 Robinson, WC, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions, (Boston: Little Brown & Co,
1890), Ch 2, s 157, page 229. “Every invention in the industrial arts is either an opera-
tion or an instrument.” From there on, in Robinson’s entire discussion of “art” the
modifier “industrial” is unspoken, yet plainly assumed.
28 Shell Oil Co v Canada (Patent Commissioner), [1982] 2 SCR 536, 67 CPR (2d) 1
[Shell Oil].
29 Refrigerating Equipment Ltd v Waltham Systems Inc, [1930] 4 DLR 926, [1930] Ex CR
154.
140   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
progress of the useful arts. That central, essential, purpose has never changed, de-
spite any recent glosses. The preambles of those Acts have the definition of the
statutory classes found in all subsequent patent statutes in Canada: 
Whereas it is expedient for encouragement of genius and of arts in this
Province to secure an exclusive right to the invention of any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter . . .
The word “process” was added to the definition in the 1923 Patent Act
revisions.
Further, the wording of s 6, para 2 of the 1836 US Patent Act reflecting the
premise that claimed subject-matter must pertain to “art or science”, can be com-
pared to the parallel wording of current section 27(3)(b) of the Canadian Act,
above. The language of s 27(3)(b) was introduced in 1935, as then s 35. That the
invention fall in the “useful arts” or in “art or science” (which, apparently,
amounted to the same thing) has been a constant principle of patent law in Canada
since at least as early as 1823.
It can only be presumed that when Canada copied the words of the US statute
the intention was to copy their meaning and scope. As such, the meaning of the
statutory classes cannot be broader than “science and the useful arts” authorized in
Art 1, s 8 of the US Constitution. Thus, the meaning imported (a) relates to “sci-
ence and the useful arts”; (b) is based on the US Patent Act of 1793 whose purpose
was the promotion of the “useful arts”; and (c) carries the hidden plural meanings
of “useful” and “art” the US Patent Act of 1793 from which section 6 of the US
Patent Act of 1836 inherited the statutory classes.
Canadian case law does not consider the plural contexts of the words “useful”
and “art”, or that the definition of invention in s 2 supports, and is subordinate to,
the requirement for claims having subject-matter under s 27(4). Instead, it considers
the novelty of the word “new” and it considers the specific utility in the context of
the new art of the particular invention claimed, but it does not consider whether the
“art” itself is one of the “useful arts”. Further, since there is no constitutional limi-
tation on the type of patents the Crown can grant in Canada, the origin of the statu-
tory classes in the “Science and useful Arts” of the US Constitution has been for-
gotten. That origin, and the double meaning, was also forgotten by Congress in the
1952 amendment, replacing “art” with “process”. The term “useful art” carries a
meaning that “process” does not.30 The useful arts exclude, e.g., methods of con-
ducting a business, and processes related to the conduct of a profession. An “art”,
and a “useful art” are not limited to processes or methods. There are fruits of the
“useful arts” that may not necessarily be “science”, and that may be, or may yield,
physical objects such as machines or products. In the example above, shoemaking
is an art. Following the methods or processes of that art yields physical objects,
namely shoes. The word “art” thus includes, but is not limited to, a series of steps
to be performed. Generically, it has broader meaning.
The distinction between the two questions, does the invention fall within “Sci-
ence and the useful Arts?”, and the more administrative, “Into which pigeon-hole
defined by the statutory classes does that invention fit?” is the difference between
Chakrabarty and State Street. The issue in Chakrabarty was whether a life-form,
30 See Application of Musgrave, 431 F 2d 882 (Cust & Pat App, 1970) [Musgrave].
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namely bacteria for digesting oil, undeniably the result of scientific research (and
therefore unquestionably within the “natural science” portion of “Science and the
useful Arts”), fit into one of the statutory classes. In that context, the class defini-
tions are correctly given an expansive definition: it would defeat the cornerstone,
constitutionally mandated principle of the statute “to promote the progress of the
useful arts” to deprive a valuable scientific invention of protection merely because
it falls between two stools.31 Hence, the incautious use in Chakrabarty of “any-
thing under the Sun made by man” is about avoiding the possibility of meritorious
inventions falling down an administrative crack.32 By contrast, State Street was not
about finding the correct pigeon-hole, but rather whether anything in the claims
satisfied the threshold requirement of falling within “Science and the useful Arts”.
Two separate issues.
Although Stern reported that “The Supreme Court has never addressed the
meaning of “useful Arts”, although over 100 of its opinions mention the phrase”,33
it had been addressed in lower court decisions, notably Musgrave,34 and was subse-
quently the basis of both the concurring opinion of Mayer J in the re-hearing en
banc in the Federal Circuit in Bilski, and the reasons of Stevens J writing for him-
self, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor JJ in Bilski.35
In summary, in analyzing patent-eligible subject-matter, first, the imported
meaning is circumscribed by “Science and the useful Arts”; second, both “useful”
and “art” have plural meanings; third, there is a first question being asked (Is it
within “science and the useful arts”?), followed by a second question (Does it fit
into one of the statutory class pigeon holes?); and fourth, inasmuch as Canada cop-
ied the US provisions, it would require peculiar logic to suggest that the terms were
intended to have a different meaning or scope.
31 The same point is made in the dissent in Harvard Mouse at 44-45: “We should not
encourage the Commissioner to try to circle each of the five definitional words with
tight language that creates arbitrary gaps between, for example, “manufacture” and
“composition of matter” through which useful inventions can fall out of the realm of
patentability. To do so would conflict with this Court’s earlier expression of a “judicial
anxiety to support a really useful invention”: [[Consolboard Inc . . . at p 521, citing
Hinks & Son . . .]]. The definition of invention should be read as a whole and expan-
sively with a view to giving protection to what is novel and useful and unobvious.”
32 The out-of-context use of “anything under the Sun made by man” has been criticised
by several authors, including Stevens J in Bilski v Kappos, as being opposite to the
actual meaning.
33 Richard H Stern, “Being Within the Useful Arts as a Further Requirement for US Pat-
ent Eligibility”, [2009] EIPR 6,10, fn 57.
34 See Musgrave, supra note 30, one of the few cases touching on the Constitutional
meaning of “useful arts” directly: “All that is necessary, in our view, to make a se-
quence of operational steps a statutory “process” within 35 USC § 101 is that it be in
the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to
promote the progress of “useful arts.” Const Art 1, sec. 8.”
35 Bilski, supra note 3 per Stevens, p 1:“Rather than making any broad statements about
how to define the term “process” in s 101 or tinkering with the bounds of the category
of unpatentable, abstract ideas, I would restore patent law to its historical and constitu-
tional moorings.” (Emphasis added.)
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(g) The Act of Invention
All patentable inventions require as a pre-requisite that there be an act of in-
vention. An inventive act requires a mental element and a non-purely-mental ele-
ment: an idea, or conception; and a practical way of realizing that conception.36
The mental element is a creative act of the named inventor.37 The mental portion
has two components — an idea of an inventive object, and an idea of a means (“a
way of carrying it out”) to attain that object.38 The mental portion may be very
36 Permutit v Borrowman, [1926] 4 DLR 285, 43 RPC 356 (PC) as approved in Rice v
Christiani & Nielsen, [1930] 4 DLR 401, [1930] SCR 443: “It is not enough for a man
to say that an idea floated through his brain; he must at least have reduced it to a
definite and practical shape before he can be said to have invented a process. . . . The
conception of the idea “coupled with the way of carrying it out” and “reduced to a
definite and practical shape” constituted the invention of his process . . .” [i.e., in re-
spect of processes in particular.]
See also in Rice: “The holding here, therefore is that by the date of discovery of the
invention is meant the date at which the inventor can prove he has first formulated,
either in writing or [orally], a description which affords the means of making that
which was invented. There is no necessity of a disclosure to the public.” . . . “The
conception of the idea “coupled with the way of carrying it out” and “reduced to a
definite and practical shape” constituted the invention of his process, . . .” (Internal
citations omitted).
37 Subsequent searching of prior art may show that the claim, while new to the applicant
himself, had previously been known or used by others — a routine prospect facing
every patent applicant. However, the type of subject-matter of a claim found to be
potentially patent-eligible for the purposes of searching does not change once anticipa-
tory art is found. Subject-matter remains as it was, but the claim is unpatentable be-
cause it does not meet the other “conditions and requirements of this title”, in 35 USC
101. See also Patent Act s 27(1): The Commissioner shall grant a patent for an inven-
tion to an inventor . . . if an application for the patent in Canada is filed in accordance
with this Act and all other requirements for the issuance of a patent under this Act are
met.” (Emphasis added.)
38 See Diversified Products Corp v Tye-Sil Corp (1991), 35 CPR (3d) 350 (Fed CA) at pp
364-365, in particular quoting from Hickton’s Patent Syndicate v Patents & Machine
Improvements Co (1909), 26 RPC 339 [Hickton’s]:
“In my opinion, invention may lie in the idea, and it may lie in the way
in which it is carried out, and it may lie in the combination of the two;
but if there is invention in the idea plus the way of carrying it out, then
it is good subject-matter for Letters Patent.” [i.e., in respect of inven-
tions generally]
Per Fletcher Moulton LJ at p 348: “. . . but I think you are losing grasp
of the substance and seizing the shadow when you say that the inven-
tion is the manufacture as distinguished from the idea. It is much more
true to say that the patent is for the idea as distinguished from the thing
being manufactured. No doubt you cannot patent an idea, which you
have simply conceived, and have suggested no way of carrying out,
but the invention consists in thinking of or conceiving something and
suggesting a way of doing it . . .” [i.e., in respect of inventions
generally]
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slight.39 However slight, the creative component must be accompanied by some-
thing else that (i) is not a purely mental act, and (ii) is not otherwise dependent
upon the use of non-reliably-repeatable human judgment or skill.40 That “some-
thing else” converts the purely mental act or idea into something practical by which
the idea of means is accomplished. In Canada, the requirement for practicality is
met if the claim encompasses an embodiment41 for which the specification pro-
vides a description enabling a person of skill to practice that invention. In US law,
it is the basis of the requirement of reduction to practice. It is a form of objective
evidence that the invention has some definable substance, and that the necessary
non-purely-mental inventive act is complete. An inquiry into whether a process is
merely a series of purely mental steps is not an inquiry into whether that process
falls within “Science and the useful Arts”.42 Purely mental steps may relate to the
useful arts or any other art. However it may be, purely mental operations or
processes, alone, are not patent-eligible in Canada.43
Equally, a listing of means without a mental act or idea also fails to constitute
an act of invention. This is the problem of “mere aggregation” as opposed to inven-
tive combination. A mere aggregation of parts not in themselves patentable and
producing no new result is unpatentable. As recently as Free World Trust,44 the law
on aggregation was taken to be that of R v Uhlemann Optical Co45 that “The inven-
39 “There must be a substantial exercise of the inventive power or inventive genius,
though it may in cases be very slight. Slight alterations or improvements may produce
important results and may disclose great ingenuity. . . . A new combination of well
known devices, and the application thereof to a new and useful purpose may require
invention to produce it, and may be good subject-matter for a patent.” — Canadian
General Electric Co v Fada Radio Ltd, [1930] 1 DLR 449 (Canada PC) per Lord War-
rington at 451-452, quoting Maclean J with approval. See also Hickton’s, supra note
38.
40 The person of skill must be able to practice the claimed invention without the exercise
of inventive skill. Therefore the invention claimed must be reliably repeatable, based
on the instructions found in the specification. Success cannot then depend on subjective
individual judgment or skill to produce something within the claims.
41 The inventor is not limited to claims that cover only the embodiments described by the
inventor: Rice, supra. note 36. “Bayer invented a new principle and a practical means
of applying it. He “was not bound to describe every method [i.e., every embodiment]
by which his invention could be carried into effect.”
42 See In re Musgrave, supra note 30, where the concurring opinion is fixated requiring
that the invention be physical, when the majority is deciding the case on the completely
different constitutional ground.
43 See Schlumberger Ltd v Canada (Patent Commissioner), infra note 61.
44 Free World Trust c Électro Santé Inc, [2000] 2 SCR 1024 [Free World Trust].
45 R v Uhlemann Optical Co (1951), [1952] 1 SCR 143: “With this interpretation of the
specification and of the claims it is clearly shown that Uhlemann’s invention consists
in combination and it matters not therefore whether as contended by counsel for the
appellant the elements thereof are old and were already known in the art as separate
entities. As was pointed out by this Court in Baldwin International Radio Co of
Canada Ltd v Western Electric Co Inc et al., on this branch of the case viz anticipation
the only point is whether the actual combination is new. It is idle to repeat that antici-
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tion lies in the particular combination provided it is not mere aggregation or juxta-
position of known contrivances.” An inquiry into aggregation is not an inquiry into
whether all of the admittedly known elements are found in a single reference,46 or
whether a person of skill would have made the combination. It is an inquiry into
whether the combination, once made, yields something, a result, that is more than
the sum of the parts.47 It does not matter that all of the elements are known in the
art — in the traditional arts most claims are for combinations of old elements. Ag-
gregation is not an issue of novelty. It is not an issue of obviousness. It is an issue
of lack of an act of invention.
The same issue is the focus of the recent USSC decision in Mayo
Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.48 The court summarised:
“To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about
certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, con-
ventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps,
when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts
taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those
regularities”.49 (Emphasis added.)
The USSC requires the claims to be viewed as a whole, not as a collection of
separate elements to be analysed individually for subject-matter. Second, the Court
is looking for something that is more than the sum of the parts. As above, the “sum
of the parts” inquiry is not an inquiry into whether all of the elements are found in a
single prior reference, and it is not an inquiry into whether a person skilled in the
art would have made the combination. It is an inquiry into whether the combina-
tion, once made, yields that “something more”.
It is the integration of the idea and the practical elements that matters. Artifi-
cially dressing up a mere idea with pre-solution or post-solution steps is not suffi-
pation is not established by what may be qualified the imaginary assemblage of sepa-
rate elements gathered from glosses selected here and there in several and distinct ante-
rior specifications. The invention lies in the particular combination provided it is not
mere aggregation or juxtaposition of known contrivances.”
46 In Shell Oil, supra note 28, all of the elements were found in a single item of prior art,
yet the use, alone, was sufficient for the combination to meet the test of invention.
47 Free World Trust, supra note 44 at para 27. See also Hershkovitz v Tyco Safety
Products Canada Ltd, 2009 FC 256 at para 148: A combination of elements is patenta-
ble but a mere aggregation of elements is not. The difference is that in an unpatentable
aggregation, the elements do not cooperate and interact to give a novel unified result,
whereas in a patentable combination, there is cooperation or interaction of elements so
as to yield a novel, unobvious and advantageous result that is more than the sum of
what the elements taken individually would generate: see RH Barrigar, Canadian Pat-
ent Act Annotated, 2nd ed (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) at PA-28.11-12; Domtar
Ltd v McMillan Bloedel Packaging Ltd (1977), 33 CPR (2d) 182 (Fed TD) at 189–91;
affirmed (1978), 41 CPR (2d) 182 (Fed CA). (Emphasis added.)
48 Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 132 S Ct 1289 (2012)
[Mayo].
49 Ibid, per Breyer, page 11, lines 1–10. See also Robinson, supra note 27.
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cient.50 This point is captured in the USSC Mackay Radio case: “While a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be”.51
(Emphasis added.) What matters is the whole.52
Substantially the same point is made in Anglo-Canadian case law well before
1949. In Klaber’s Patent,53 Lord Davey observed: 
A proper combination for a patent is the union of two or more integers,
every one of which elements may be perfectly old, for the production of one
object which is either new, or at any rate is for effecting an old object in a
more convenient, cheaper, or more useful way. But the point in a combina-
tion patent must always be that the elements of which the combination is
composed are combined together so as to produce one result. (Emphasis
added.)
Similarly, in Wright v Brake Service Ltd,54 Maclean J wrote: 
According to long established principles, a combination may be composed
of elements wholly new or wholly old, or partly new and partly old.55 In
each case the combination is a means distinct from the elements, whether
new or old. It is an instrument or operation, formed by uniting two or more
subordinate instruments or operations, in a new idea of means.56 It is the
combination of individual functions, so as to constitute a common function.
A combination in a mechanism must consist of distinct mechanical parts,
50 Diamond, supra note 1 at 192: “Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. To hold otherwise would
allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject-
matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process
which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws
were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or
thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.” and “In my opinion, it
equally requires rejection of Claim 11 because the pre-solution activity described in
that claim is admittedly a familiar part of the prior art”.
51 Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co v Radio Corporation of America, 306 US 86 (1939) at
94 [Mackay].
52 Diamond, supra note 1: “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process
for patent protection under §101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim
because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the
constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combi-
nation was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim
falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” (Emphasis
added).
53 Klaber’s Patent (1906), 23 RPC 461 (HL) at 469.
54 Wright v Brake Service Ltd, [1925] Ex CR 127 (Can Ex Ct) at 130; affirmed [1926]
SCR 434 (SCC) [Wright].
55 See Halle v Johnson, 23 OG 2411 at 2412, cited in Robinson at s 1455, p 219, fn 1.
56 See Robinson, supra note 27 at s 155 p 216.
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having some relation to each other, and each having some function in the
organism. When these elements are so united that by their reciprocal influ-
ence upon each other, and by the joint and co-operating action of all the
elements with respect to the work to be done, or in furtherance thereof, new
or additional results are obtained, the union is a true combination.57 Alto-
gether the authorities seem to support the proposition, that if in a new com-
bination, an arrangement of known elements produces a new combination,
or if it forms a new machine of distinct character or formation due to the co-
operative action of all the elements, or if the several elements produce a new
and useful result or an old result in a cheaper or entirely advantageous way,
this is evidence of invention and fit subject-matter for a patent.58, 59 (Foot-
notes added.)
Finally, the requirement for an act of invention is a prerequisite for subsequent
substantive analysis for novelty, utility, or obviousness. The question of whether
there has been an inventive act sufficient to define a date of invention to establish
entitlement to priority as between two competing inventors in Permutit v Bor-
rowman and in Rice v Christiani & Nielsen is not an inquiry into whether the in-
vention of that act is novel or obvious. Under a conflict proceeding in Canada, or a
US interference proceeding, the question of inventorship, and therefore entitlement,
turned on date of invention — an inquiry to which art-based issues of validity were
irrelevant. Whether subject-matter is statutory is a question of the nature of the
inventive act. It is either statutory, or it is not. The nature of an invention is not a
question of breadth. The allowable limits of claim scope, i.e., breadth, are deter-
mined, first, by the requirement of support in the application as filed under s 27(3),
and, second, given such subject-matter support, by the territory already occupied by
the prior art under anticipation and obviousness. Determining the nature of an in-
vention is an inquiry that is entirely separate from determining the breadth of claim
scope to which that invention is entitled.
(h) “Business Methods” and “Methods of Doing Business”
The common use of “business methods” since State Street, does not appear to
have the same meaning as “a method of doing business” in older, pre-1960, pre-
software, cases, under which “methods of doing business” were, typically, schemes
or plans for doing business.60 More recently, “business methods” has often been
applied to computer implemented methods.
In the “method of doing business” cases, the rationale for exclusion can be any
one of (a) failure to fall within “Science and the useful Arts”; (b) falling within the
57 See Robinson, supra note 27 at s 155 p 219.
58 See Stephenson v Brooklyn Cross-Town R Co, 114 US 149 (1885) (Canada PC) at 157
per Woods J cited in Robinson at s 155, p 219, fn 1 31 OG 263 at 265.
59 Courts in Canada have long relied on patent principles found in US law. Maclean J was
an outstanding patent judge, and this decision, clearly echoing parallel US jurispru-
dence, was affirmed by the SCC long ago.
60 For example, under US law: Hotel Security Checking Co v Lorraine Co, 160 F 467 (2d
Cir, 1908); In re Wait, 73 F 2d 982 (Cust & Pat App, 1934); Loew’s Drive-In Theatres
v Park-In Theatres, 174 F 2d 547 (1st Cir, 1949) (Drive in theatres); Under English
law: Cooper’s Application (1902), 19 RPC 53 (AG).
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exercise of professional skill; and (c) being dependent upon the use of human
judgement or skill, and so therefore (i) not necessarily resulting in something fall-
ing within the claims, and (ii) not being something for which a fully enabling dis-
closure has been provided. It may be noted that these rationales all partially overlap
each other. By contrast, the issue of whether something is merely an “abstract idea”
pertains to determining whether there has been a completed act of invention. That
question is unrelated to whether the activity fails to fall within Science and the
useful Arts.
II. THE ROAD TO AMAZON
The meaning of four earlier cases was contested in Amazon.com,
chronologically:
(a) Lawson v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)61
(b) Schlumberger Ltd v Canada (Patent Commissioner)62
(c) Shell Oil Co v Canada (Patent Commissioner);63 and
(d) Progressive Games Inc v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)64
A discussion of these cases follows, starting with Lawson.
(a) Lawson
The Lawson application was filed on 11 March 1963 — before the informa-
tion technology era. The claims concerned division of land into champagne-glass
shaped building lots. Only dependent claim 5 was under appeal. It is shown as
Appendix item 1. The issue was whether the plan of land development could be
patent-eligible subject-matter. However, rather than determining whether the
claims pertained to an art or science within the Patent Act, the reasons focus on
whether the plan was an “art” in s 2. Basing himself on the Australian case
National Research Development Corp v Commissioners of Patents65 [NRDC] Cat-
tanach J wrote: 
It is obvious from the concluding portion of the above quotation [from
NRDC] that professional skills are not the subject-matter of a patent . . .
It seems to me that a method of describing and laying out parcels of land in
a plan of subdivision . . . [is] the skill of a solicitor and conveyancer and that
of a planning consultant and surveyor. It is an art which belongs to the pro-
61 Lawson v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970), 62 CPR 101 (Can Ex Ct) per
Cattanch J [Lawson].
62 Schlumberger Ltd v Canada (Patent Commissioner) (1981), 56 CPR (2d) 204, [1982] 1
FC 845 [Schlumberger].
63 Shell Oil, supra note 28.
64 Progressive Games Inc v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 177 FTR 241 (TD); aff’d
(2000), 9 CPR (4th) 479 (Fed CA) [Progressive Games].
65 National Research Development Corp v Commissioners of Patents (1960), [1961] RPC
135 (Australia HC) [NRDC].
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fessional field and is not a manual art or skill.66
I, therefore, conclude that the method devised by the applicant herein for
subdividing land is not an art within the meaning of that word in s 2(d).67
Cooper’s Application (1902), 19 RPC 53 (AG) (Emphasis added.)
This professional skills ratio was reinforced by rejecting the position of the
US Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) in the corresponding US
case, and preferring instead the examiner’s reasoning in the UK case ESP’s
Application, Re:68
It is clear from this claim and from the description and drawings that the
alleged invention is, in essence, merely an architect’s plan or design for the
layout of the individual houses in a row of houses. It has never been the
practice of this Office to regard such plans as “manners of new manufac-
ture” within the meaning of s 93 and to grant patents for them would . . . be
an unfair restraint on the normal use of an architect’s designing powers in
the exercise of his profession . . . The sole advantages alleged . . . are mat-
ters which . . . belong to the province of the architect rather than the
manufacturer.
Cattanach J buttressed his approach by finding that:
. . . the words “manner of manufacture [in the English, Australian and N.Z.
cases] are merely a compendious way of expressing the same ideas con-
tained in the words “art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter.
Therefore it is accepted in principle that the requirements with regard to
subject-matter of a patent are co-extensive under the British and Canadian
statutes and that the jurisprudence established by the Courts of the United
Kingdom is authoritative in Canada.69
This holding allowed adoption of the ratio in NRDC as law in Canada on the
limits of “art” in respect of the exercise of professional skill.
(b) Lawson — Physical Agents and Physical Objects
Despite having been decided on the issue of professional skill and judgment,
Lawson lives on for the obiter statement: 
An art or operation is an act or series of acts performed by some physical
agent upon some physical object and producing in such object some change
either of character or of condition. It is abstract in that, it is capable of con-
templation of the mind. It is concrete in that it consists in the application of
physical agents to physical objects and is then apparent to the senses in con-
66 The distinction between professional skill and manual labour is rarely found in North
American case law, It was more common in older English cases. One rationale was that
the professions should not be hobbled by monopolies.
67 Lawson, supra note 61 at p 111.
68 ESP’s Application, Re (1945), 62 RPC 87.
69 Lawson, supra note 61 at p 111. This statement was criticised sharply by Gordon Hen-
derson in the editorial note in 62 CPR at pp 102-103. Fox’s view was firmly rejected
by Pigeon J in the Tennessee Eastman Co v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1972),
[1974] SCR 111 appeal, as discussed below.
MISADVENTURES ON PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT-MATTER   149
nection with some tangible object or instrument.
In the troubled history of subject-matter cases in the US, UK, and Common-
wealth, a special place belongs to the subsequent obiter discussion in which Cat-
tanach J explained why, having found physical change to be necessary, the land
was not a “manufacture” because it was physically unchanged. Cattanach J ana-
logised a physical change under s 2 of the Patent Act to a physical change in land
for the purposes of taxation as inventory of a business, or as a capital asset, citing
his own decision in Moluch v Minister of National Revenue70 under the Income Tax
Act. Thus did the basis of “physicality” arrive in Canada.
(i) Origin in Robinson on Patents
That all claims must have “physicality” is not a requirement of the statute, nor
was it a requirement in older cases.71 The Lawson paragraph does not originate in
the Patent Act, or, apparently, in Canadian law. The Lawson definition of “art”,
came, without citation, almost verbatim from Robinson, where art is anything other
than the classes relating to instruments. 
An art or operation is an act or series of acts performed by some physical
object, and producing in such object some change either of character or of
condition. It is also called a “process”, or a “mode of treatment” and it is
said to require that “certain things be done with certain substances in a cer-
tain order”. It is so far abstract that it is capable of contemplation by the
mind apart from any one of the specific instruments by which it is per-
formed. It is so far concrete that it consists in the application of physical
force through physical agents to physical objects, and can thus become ap-
parent to the senses only in connection with some tangible instrument and
object.72
Robinson continued: 
It has, however, always been the settled law of this country that any artifi-
cial operation performed by physical agents and producing physical effects
within the domain of the industrial arts, is a true invention, and can be pat-
ented as such without reference to the specific instruments engaged or the
specific objects in which the effects may be produced.73 (Emphasis added.)
Robinson’s inclusion of the word “physical” was a gloss on the USSC case
Cochrane v Deener,74 which Robinson had cited in support: 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
70 Moluch v Minister of National Revenue (1966), [1967] 2 Ex CR 158, [1966] CTC 712
[Moluch].
71 In the steam engine cases the defendants complained that Watt’s claims did not include
an apparatus (admittedly old), but only a method. A similar issue arises in
Westinghouse Electric Corp, Re (1983), 6 CPR (3d) 58. The computer program was a
method of operating machinery more efficiently — and well within the useful arts.
72 Robinson, supra note 27, s 159 at pp 230-231. Although the Lawson paragraph is
clearly based on Robinson, Cattanach J did not cite the source. The same quasi-quota-
tion was used, with citation, in Tennessee Eastman at 62 CPR 130, footnote 2.
73 Ibid, s 163, p 242–244.
74 Cochrane v Deener (1876), 94 US 780 per Bradley J at 788 [Cochrane].
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result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If [also] new and use-
ful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery.
Although cited with approval as recently as Diamond v Diehr,75 Cochrane v
Deener is no longer good law in the US in light of the rejection of the machine-or-
transformation test76 as definitive by six members of the court77 in Bilski. In any
case, Cochrane v Deener said nothing about a physical object, force, or effect.
Nonetheless, Robinson’s gloss was picked up in Lawson and made a central point
in the subsequent FCA analysis in Amazon.com — without basis in the Patent Act,
and without basis in the underlying, un-cited, US, case law, which, itself, has now
been overturned by the USSC on the point.
The quotation in Lawson is from Chapter II of Robinson, concerning the statu-
tory classes. Robinson starts by indicating that “Every invention in the industrial
arts is either an operation or an instrument”,78 That is, the claim has already been
presumed to fall within the “industrial arts”, (i.e., the useful arts), before consider-
ing which pigeon-hole is correct.
(ii) Origin in British and Commonwealth Law
In British, Australian and New Zealand law the “tangible object” language
appears to come via NRDC, quoting from the Australian case, Maeder v Busch.79
Maeder v Busch is also quoted at length in Tennessee Eastman.80 It is from this
source that the prohibition of patenting a “disembodied idea” is drawn. According
to keyword searching, prior to Tennessee Eastman, there is no reported Canadian
patent case that uses the words “disembodied idea”. The words appeared in NDRC,
quoting from Maeder v Busch.
Maeder v Busch concerned whether a method of giving hair a “permanent”
constituted patentable subject-matter. The source for both “tangible thing” and
“disembodied idea” is a quote “Applications of old things to a new use, accompa-
nied by the exercise of inventive power are often patentable, though there be no
production of a new thing. But in every case the invention must refer to and be
applicable to a tangible thing. A disembodied idea is not patentable. (Edmunds and
Bentwich, Copyright in Designs, 2nd Ed (1908) pp 20, 21.)” However, pages 20-21
of the Edmunds and Bentwich discuss prerequisites for the registration of industrial
75 Diamond, supra note 1 at 182-183.
76 Bilski, supra note 3, per Kennedy J at p 7: “It is true that Cochrane v Deener . . .
explained that a process is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.” More recent cases, how-
ever, have rejected the broad implications of this dictum; and, in all events, later au-
thority shows that it was not intended as an exhaustive or exclusive test.” (Citations
omitted).
77 The majority supporting the Kennedy opinion, plus Breyer J who wrote a concurring
opinion on the point.
78 Robinson, supra note 27 at section 157, page 229.
79 Maeder v Busch (1938), 59 CLR 684 [Maeder].
80 Tennessee Eastman Co v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1970] Ex CJ No 14, 62
CPR 117 [Tennessee].
MISADVENTURES ON PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT-MATTER   151
designs under the UK Designs Act of 1907.81 It is unrelated to patents for inven-
tions. Rather it explains that a Design is not registrable unless applied to a physical
object. Yet language of the 1907 UK Designs Act, interpreted in cases (a) for a
hairdressing permanent in 1938; and (b) for drawing land lots like champagne
glasses, has (as seen below) metamorphosed half a century later into a basis for
excluding software and business methods from patent eligibility under s 2 of the
Canadian Patent Act.
The Lawson claims were unpatentable for the most fundamental of reasons:
they were not directed to subject-matter within “science and the useful arts.” How-
ever Lawson skipped to the second question, under s 2, rather than asking the more
fundamental question first.
That the “physical” gloss was ill-founded can be confirmed by considering
that, if it had been applied, neither the Armstrong claims for FM radio (CA
218,281), nor the Rantzen claims for using radio signals (GB 587,447), nor claim 5
of US RE 117 of Morse for Morse Code, nor the Chatfield claim for multiple pro-
gram processing optimization would be patentable under Canadian law.82, 83 While
neither the Armstrong, nor Rantzen, nor Morse, nor Chatfield claims, found in the
Appendix at items 2, 3, 4 and 5, would meet a physicality requirement, they would,
however, meet almost any other test based on subject-matter being in the industrial
arts, or “science and the useful arts”, pertaining to the application of scientific
learning or knowledge.
Furthermore, the patentability of a claim cannot automatically be precluded
because the inventor has used a virtual element rather than an unquestionably phys-
ical mechanical or electro-mechanical equivalent. The patentability of an invention
cannot change merely because software is used in place of a functionally equivalent
electro-mechanical relay, or because a memory chip stores information rather than
a Hollerith card. Absent an unexpected result or advantage, patent eligibility cannot
logically turn on whether functional equivalents are “physical” or not.
In the end, there is perhaps more merit in looking to the practical application
of learning in the industrial arts or “science and the useful arts” for an understand-
ing of the boundaries of patent-eligible subject-matter, which bears a logical rela-
tionship to patent fundamentals, and has a clear basis in the origin, purpose, and
history of the Act.
III. SCHLUMBERGER
(a) What Did Schlumberger Really Claim?
Schlumberger was an attempt to obtain claims for data processing of well bore
down-hole log data. The published reasons are not overly helpful: they conjure up
the image of a method of sensing, transmitting and processing data to yield some
81 The same provisions being found in the corresponding Australian and New Zealand
statutes.
82 Nor would the claims in CA 1,180,813 of Dialog Systems. See (1984), 5 CPR (3d) 423.
83 See also Morse RE 117, claim 4; Ex Parte McNabb and Voss, 127 USPQ 456 (Pat Off
Bd App, 1960) (detection of defects in wooden objects); Ex Parte Kahn, 124 USPQ 51
(Pat Off Bd App, 1960) (method of insect control using recordings of female insects).
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specific output result from which the company drilling the bore can determine, e.g.,
if there is water, oil, or gas there. However, the Schlumberger claims, found at item
6 of the Appendix, were not so directed. As can be seen, a person skilled in the art
could not really tell what these claims are directed toward calculating. Claim 1
amounts to:
1. Measuring something down a borehole, and “machine combining” that
something to compute some kind of output parameter.
The “machine combining” appears to mean feeding the data into a computer
and doing automated calculations to yield a result, although when read literally it
also encompasses use of a steam-powered abacus. There is no genuine claim.
Claim 1 amounts to a claim for using a computer for anything having to do with
well data. Schlumberger amended the claims during prosecution to include claim
46, which amounts to, roughly “46. Applying a computer of any kind to analyse
well logging data of any kind.”
(b) Where Are The Formulae?
Contrary to the impression that might be given by the FCA reasons in Ama-
zon.com, not only was there no novel formula in either claim 1 or claim 46, there
was no formula at all.
Both independent claims in Schlumberger give rise to the usually mutually
inconsistent rejections of (a) being indefinite; and (b) being obvious.84 In respect of
(a), it is impossible to say the claims are really limited to anything, such that no
person of skill would know where the scope of the claims really starts or ends. In
respect of (b), it is easy to see that the claim draftsman was trying to draft limita-
tions-that-are-not-limitations, such that when all the non-limiting limitations are
swept away, all that remains is the application of computer processing to well log
data. As Pratte J correctly observed, given the nature of computers, the use of a
computer for data reduction is obvious. All three rejections should have been made.
Oddly, the Office chose to object only to lack of patent-eligible subject-matter
under s 2, and not for indefiniteness or obviousness.
(c) The Unstable Feedback Loop of Schlumberger
The Examiner having raised the wrong rejection, the Patent Appeal Board
(PAB) pursued an inquiry under s 2 and then-section 28(3), including a lengthy
analysis of US law on the patentability of computer programs. However, as can be
seen by reading the claims, Schlumberger was not seeking claims for a computer
program. The PAB found, inter alia:
(i) A computer program may be thought of as that portion of computer
ware which may be written or printed on paper in an alphanumeric source
language, magnetically recorded on tapes, or used with punch cards or in
84 A rejection for indefiniteness, or ambiguity, implies that the claim does not meet the
requirements of the Act because it cannot be understood. If a claim cannot be under-
stood, then it is inconsistent to reject the same claim as being obvious. Therefore the
two rejections are usually considered mutually exclusive.
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computer acceptable form. In other words it provides the working direc-
tions for the computer hardware.
(ii) An algorithm is, in general, a set of rules or processes for solving a
problem in a finite number of steps.
(iii) In our view the basic reason why the program itself is not patentable
is that a program is analogous in form to a printed or design matter, and if
the novelty lies solely in the intellectual connotations of the printed or
design matter, it is not patentable. On this point we refer to British Petro-
leum Co Ltd’s Application, Official Journal of Patents (1968) where it is
stated: “. . . the intellectual content of a punched tape [computer pro-
gram] is clearly not patentable . . .”
(iv) What happens in the main is that a typical program-related applica-
tion poses a problem. It describes the development of an algorithm to
solve that problem, converts the algorithm to a computer program per se,
and then claims are couched or clothed in obscure language designed to
ward off objections that the application is directed to an algorithm or
computer program. In our view the development of algorithms and com-
puter programs, however difficult, is nothing more than the expected skill
of a programmer and therefore not patentable. Assuming, arguendo, that
a programmer has used his creative skill in designing a specific unobvi-
ous program, the novelty lies solely in the intellectual connotations of the
printed matter and is not, in our view, patentable. Many matters involving
great creativity are just not encompassed by Section 2 of the Patent Act.
(Emphasis added.)
(i) is uncontroversial. (ii) is also correct, but every method claim ever granted
also falls within this definition. (iii) arises from a misunderstanding of the British
“printed forms” cases in BP, (a UK case roughly equivalent to Schlumberger) lead-
ing to the rather strange third and fourth sentences of (iv). One might as easily say
that the skill of Engineers is engineering, and so nothing invented by Engineers is
anything more than the expected skill of an Engineer.
First, there has been confusion between (a) the purpose of Patent law, in re-
spect of protection of functional subject-matter; and (b) the purpose of Copyright
and Design law to protect the form of presentation. Second, there has been confu-
sion between (a) the patentability of a method with (b) the medium of expression of
the intellectual content of the method.
(d) Algorithms and Methods: Often Synonymous
Virtually all methods that can be implemented by machine, can be expressed
as algorithms, and converted into computer code. The words “algorithm” and
“method” are often synonyms. Neither the conversion of the logical steps of a
method into an algorithm, nor into a computer program, nor into machine code,
should have any bearing on the patent eligibility of a method or process. An other-
wise patentable method does not become less (or more) patentable when converted
into an algorithm, any more than if translated into German or Chinese. The focus
on the word “algorithm” seems to have started with the US case Gottschalk v Ben-
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son.85 In Benson the methods pertained to conversion of numbers from a decimal
format in base 10 to a digital format in base 2 (i.e., “binary coded decimal”, or
BCD). The Court found that: 
The conversion of BCD numerals to pure binary numerals can be done men-
tally through use of the foregoing table. The method sought to be patented
varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by changing the
order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier used in
some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation. The
mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in
use, no new machinery being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be
performed without a computer.86
The court then noted the three existing standard US exceptions: (a) “An idea
of itself is not patentable”87 (b) “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented as no one can claim in either
of them an exclusive right”.88 (c) Phenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are
the basis tools of scientific and technological work.89
Benson has been problematic. The court used the word “algorithm” for proce-
dures for solving problems by computer.90 It then found the process (not the al-
gorithm) “so abstract and sweeping” as to cover known and unknown uses, and to
do so without even requiring any apparatus.91 On the basis that an idea may not be
patented, the Court balked at granting a patent that would “wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself”.92 Noting concerns that computer programs were unsearchable,93 the court
then asked Congress to act.94
However, the method was not abstract. It was a simple procedure for perform-
ing pure arithmetic. It could be performed with a pencil if desired. The Court used
“algorithm” as if every algorithm is merely basic arithmetic. However, an al-
gorithm for converting numbers from one form to another is far different from an
algorithm for controlling multi-fractional distillation in an hydrocarbon cracker.
The Benson claims were directed to purely mental acts — the Court found as much.
There was no completed inventive act. The issue was the patentability of the
method. The mode of expression was irrelevant. Nonetheless, from Benson has
come the idea that computer programs are algorithms, and algorithms are (a) ab-
85 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63 (Cust & Pat App, 1972) [Benson].
86 Ibid at 67.
87 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co v Howard, 20 Wall 498 (US, 1874) at 507, cited in Benson [Rub-
ber-Tip].
88 Le Roy v Tatham, 14 How 156 (US, 1852) at 175.
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stract; and (b) not patentable.
(e) The Medium is not the Method
The patentability of software has never lain in the form of the recording me-
dium. Holes punched in a tape or in computer cards, magnetic recordings on tape;
bumpy ridges on a vinyl disc; holes in wooden slats in a loom; Morse code dots and
dashes, binary code, hexadecimal code, or optical data on a laser-readable disc: All
have been used as recording media. The form does not affect patentability of the
substantive steps of the method:95 An otherwise patentable method cannot be dis-
qualified merely by the form of expression.
If an algorithm were used to determine which pixels of a display screen to
illuminate, when, and with what electrical current, there would be no question that
the algorithm embodies potentially patent-eligible subject-matter.96 It is no differ-
ent from identifying the addresses of Amazon.com’s customers; the selection of
which pixels to illuminate is no different from correlating an object to be sold and a
location for delivery (or billing); and the determination of current or voltage is fun-
damentally no different from sending a signal proportional to price, to charge a
capacitor, or to raise an hydraulic lift. Nonetheless, the statement in (iii), above, has
led, as in (iv), to a rule that computer programs are, per se, unpatentable.
The patentability of all inventions lies in the intellectual content. The intellec-
tual content is in the method. However, the fact that the method finds embodiment
in a computer program does not make it unpatentable.
As might be said, “The medium is not the method.”
(f) Schlumberger in the FCA
Perhaps realizing that the Office had mis-cast the grounds of rejection, the
FCA reasons in Schlumberger are brief, running exactly two pages. Revealingly, in
a comment resembling Diehr in respect of pre- and post-processing steps, Pratte J
wrote: “Now it is obvious, I think, that there is nothing new in using computers to
make calculations of the kind that are prescribed by the specifications. It is pre-
cisely in order to make that kind of calculation that computers were invented.”
(Emphasis added.) The FCA found that the discovery was “various calculations”
and “formulae”. As noted, none of those calculations or formulae appear in either
claim 1 or claim 46. It is doubtful that such an approach would now be acceptable
under purposive construction. According to the FCA:
(i) If those calculations were not to be effected by computers but by men,
the subject-matter of the application would clearly be mathematical for-
mulae and a series of purely mental operations; as such, in my view, it
would not be patentable. A mathematical formula must be assimilated to
a “mere scientific principle or abstract theorem” for which ss 28(3) of the
95 Although the form itself may be patentable, irrespective of the method. See Morse US
Patent RE 117, claim 5.
96 Seiscom Delta Inc, Re (1985), 7 CPR (3d) 506. The PAB held the subject-matter to be
statutory, but strongly suggested it was obvious. On remand to the Examiner, the case
was allowed as CA 1,196,082.
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Act prescribes that “no patent shall issue.” As to mental operations and
processes, it is clear, in my view, that they are not the kind of processes
that are referred to in the definition of invention in s 2.
(ii) If the appellant’s contention were correct, it would follow that the
mere fact that the use of computers is prescribed to perform the calcula-
tions . . . would have the effect of transforming into patentable subject-
matter what would, otherwise, be clearly not patentable.97
(iii) I am of the opinion that the fact that a computer is or should be used
to implement discovery does not change the nature of that discovery.98
(iv) “What the appellant claims as an invention here is merely the dis-
covery that by making certain calculations according to certain formu-
lae, useful information could be extracted from certain measurements.
That is not, in my view, an invention within the meaning of s 2.” (Empha-
sis added.)
As indicated in quotations (ii) and (iv), the FCA ratio was under s 2, not under
then s 28(3), that calculations carried out by mental operations and processes do not
constitute patent eligible processes under s 2. While the claimed invention was
within the useful arts, and was to a method, it failed for lack of an act of invention.
Even the obiter does not stand for the principle that “all computer programs are
unpatentable”. The obiter says that a mathematical formula is a mere scientific
principle or abstract theorem under then s 28(3), and that they do not become any
more (or less) patentable if a computer is used. The court in Schlumberger did not
equate computer programs with scientific principles or abstract theorems.
IV. SHELL OIL AND PROGRESSIVE GAMES
In the FC in Amazon.com FC, Phelan J characterized Shell Oil as: “. . . un-
equivocally the starting point for the definition of a patentable art”.99 The FCA
appeared to approve the FC commentary. Shell Oil remains the last word of the
SCC on patent-eligible subject-matter.
Shell Oil involved an admittedly old compound employed for a new use,
namely as a weed-killer. The claim at issue in Shell Oil100 is shown as Appendix
item 3. The case is famous for the finding that a “use” which may fall neither
within “machine, manufacture, or process”, does fall within s 2 under the wider
compass of the “art”.101 The invention lay in the four words “a plant growth regu-
lant” found in the claim preamble.
Several statements by Wilson J in Shell Oil are of interest in the present
discussion:
(i) I think the word “art” in the context of the definition must be given its
97 In essence the same rationale as in Diehr against trivial pre- and post-solution activity.
98 Again, in substance the same as Diehr and Prometheus.
99 FC, supra note 5, para 50.
100 Canadian Patent 1,160,073.
101 From a drafting standpoint, it is a bit surprising that the Commissioner did not object to
the format of the claim as failing distinctly to indicate that the claim was for a use.
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general connotation of learning or knowledge as commonly used in ex-
pressions such as “the state of the art” or “the prior art.102
(ii) . . . “art” [is] a word of very wide connotation and was not to be con-
fined to new processes or products or manufacturing techniques but ex-
tended as well to new and innovative methods of applying skill or knowl-
edge provided they produced effects or results commercially useful to the
public.103
From its context, the quotations discuss the reach of the statutory pigeonhole
of “art” under s 2, as opposed to the underlying, unquestioned, prerequisite that the
invention pertain to an art or science, i.e., a “useful art”. That weed killers fall
within “science and the useful arts” is never discussed: nobody would doubt that
chemistry qualifies. The requirement of a “commercially useful result”, however,
has its origin in English case law, and the need to interpret “manufactures” as en-
compassing methods. The “Science and the useful Arts” language of the US Con-
stitution was adopted to overcome that problem. It is not a requirement under the
Canadian Patent Act that an invention relate to “trade, industry, or commerce”.104
The Patent Act requires that inventions be “useful”, not “commercially useful”.
(iii) This is not a case where the inventive ingenuity is alleged to lie in
the combination; the combination is simply the means of realizing on the
new discovery potential of the compounds. This is a case where the in-
ventive ingenuity is in the discovery of the new use and no further inven-
tive step is required in the application of the compounds to that use.105
(Emphasis added.)
The importance of this statement is that it affirms that an invention need not
have any physical element, and that (a) all the elements can be old; and (b) their
combination can be old, yet that does not preclude patentability of the new use. The
discovery of a new use does not cause a physical change in the compound, yet the
new use is still a patentable invention.106
On a point that has come to have subsequent resonance, it is not uncommon
for CIPO to issue Office Actions in which there is an enumeration of the features of
the claim and a discussion, sometime fairly lengthy, of how each element is obvi-
102 Shell Oil, supra note 28 at 10.
103 Ibid at 11.
104 Consolboard, supra note 11, per Dickson J quoting from Halsbury’s Laws of England,
(3r ed), v 29, at 59: “. . . the practical usefulness of the invention does not matter, nor
does its commercial utility, unless the specification promises commercial utility, nor
does it matter whether the invention is of any real benefit to the public, or particularly
suitable for the purposes suggested.” (Emphasis added.)
105 Shell Oil, supra note 28 at 11.
106 Ibid at 12-13 quoting Wilson J quoted with approval from Hickton’s Patent, supra note
38. Query whether direct infringement would occur by mere sale labelled as “Weed
Killer” whether ever sprayed on crops, and, if sprayed, if it killed a single weed, or if,
by contrast, the label “Weed Killer” is merely inducement of infringement by the end
purchaser. The economic damage to the patentee is done when a sale is made, not when
the weeds are sprayed.
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ous, culminating in a rejection under s 2. As seen below, this occurred in the Ama-
zon.com case, for example. However, under Shell Oil the obviousness of individual
elements is not relevant to a determination under s 2: 
When once the idea of applying some well-known thing for a special and
new purpose is stated, it may be very obvious how to give effect to that
idea, and yet none the less is that a good subject-matter for a patent.107
Shell Oil also includes: 
It is true . . . that once it is decided that these compounds are to be applied to
plants, no inventive step is involved in selecting the appropriate carriers;
they are common knowledge in the field. But I think this is to miss the
point. A disembodied idea is not per se patentable. But it will be patentable
if it has a method of physical application.108
As noted above, this statement is based in part on the citation from Edmunds
& Bentwich. It states a sufficient condition for patentability. One may note that
Shell Oil does not indicate that “physical application” is a necessary condition.
Shell Oil, like Lawson, entangles unrelated rationales. For example, a com-
ment pertaining to Tennessee Eastman, noted: 
In effect, [the use of the surgical or medical adhesive tape of claimed in
Tennessee Eastman] was not patentable because it was essentially non-eco-
nomic and unrelated to trade, industry, or commerce. It was related to the
area of professional skills.109
As noted above, there is no requirement under the Act that an invention be
related to “trade, industry, or commerce”. An invention based on “professional
skills” does not become more, or less, patentable by being related to “trade, indus-
try, or commerce”. Likewise, that an invention is related to trade, industry, and
commerce, does not mean that it does not involve professional skills.
Finally, in discussing Lawson, the court in Shell Oil pointed out that the case
was not decided on the basis of lack of a physical change, but rather: 
The application [in Lawson] was rejected, again, not because the subject-
matter of the application was not an “art” within the meaning of the defini-
tion in the Act but because, like the new use for the adhesive in Tennessee
Eastman, it related to professional skills rather than to trade, industry or
commerce.110 (Emphasis added.)
Notwithstanding the mixing of “trade industry or commerce” with “profes-
sional skills”, the importance of the point is that the SCC was indicating that the
discussion of physical change in Lawson was obiter. Wilson J then quoted the now-
famous passage of Lawson, and followed that quotation with a warning, also from
107 Ibid at 12.
108 Ibid at 14.
109 This finding is based on the reasons of the Ex Ct, not the later reasons of the SCC, in
which professional skill was ignored, and the method was instead excluded under
(then) s 2(d) as being ancillary to the (now repealed) prohibition on patents for methods
of medical treatment under s 41.
110 Shell Oil, supra note 28 at 15.
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Lawson, about confusing ends with means: 
However, it is now accepted that if the invention is the means and not the
end, the inventor is entitled to a patent on the means. Wilson J, concluded
that a new use for an old compound is “no more a disembodied idea than the
applicant’s discovery of a method of equalization of thread consumption in
Hickton’s Patent. It is a newly discovered means of regulating the growth of
plants and is accordingly a “new and useful art” . . . I find no obstacle in s
36 or any other provision of the Act to the grant of a patent to the appellant
on these compositions.111
Progressive Games112 involved a method of playing poker. The importance of
Progressive Games was the filtering of the Shell Oil reasons to yield a three-part
test:
“There are thus three important elements in the test for art as articulated by
Wilson J:
(i) it must not be a disembodied idea but have a method of practical
application;
(ii) it must be a new and inventive method of applying skill and knowl-
edge; and
(iii) it must have a commercially useful result.”
However, the Progressive Games distillation diverges a bit from Shell Oil.
Item (i): (a) pertains to the Shell Oil compound claims, not the use claim; (b)
originates in the 1907 UK Designs Act; and (c) it is not what Wilson J said when
discussing the definition of “art” in the context of the use claims. The comment by
Wilson J was not about the definition of an “art”, but whether there was an inven-
tion, art or otherwise.113 Item (ii) confuses anticipation and obviousness with sub-
ject-matter eligibility. What Wilson J said was: “I think the word “art” in the con-
text of the definition must be given its general connotation of learning or
knowledge as commonly used in expressions such as “the state of the art” or “the
prior art”. Wilson J did not say that to reach the patent-eligibility threshold of being
an art required novelty, unobviousness or utility.114 As discussed above, item (iii)
is not found in the statute and is contrary to SCC precedent in Consolboard.
Filtering Shell Oil through the distorting lens of the lower court in Progressive
Games has not been helpful. The claims in Progressive Games could have been
rejected on many grounds, and the Examiner, the PAB, the FC and the FCA all
came to that result. However, the path followed bears observation.
First, there is clear precedent that methods incorporating steps requiring the
exercise of human judgement or skill are not patentable. This was the ratio in Law-
son; in Tennessee Eastman; and in a number of the English and Australian cases
reviewed in Tennessee Eastman.
111 Ibid.
112 Progressive Games, supra note 64 at para 16.
113 See Shell Oil, supra note 28 at page 14, lines 37–39.
114 Ibid at 10, last three lines; and her conclusion that the particular art of the claimed
invention is a “new and useful” art is found on page 11, lines 1–7.
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Second, “card games” can be played entirely by human memory without the
cards themselves. As in Schlumberger, there is nothing patentable in the mental
process of calculating the probability of certain card combinations occurring.
Third, the claims could have been rejected as not pertaining to art or science as
required by s 27(3). The claims in Progressive Games fail many other tests for
subject-matter proposed in Canada and elsewhere. They are not related to an indus-
trial or technological matter, or to a “manufacture”, or to producing a “vendible
product”. The claimed invention is not a matter of industry, trade, and commerce,
or an advance in an industrial art. It does not meet the increasing knowledge of
science and technology concept in Swift & Co’s Application (New Zealand), Re,
[1961] RPC 147 (NZSC) where Barrowclough CJ said: 
In my view the processes described in the present applicant’s complete
specification though not within the ordinary everyday concept of “manufac-
ture” are clearly a “manner of manufacture” as the phrase must be inter-
preted in relation to a modern world’s ever expanding and increasing
knowledge of science and technology. . . .115, 116 (Emphasis added.)
Despite the alternatives under Canadian law, the Progressive Games final re-
jection read: 
The Patent Act is designated to protect processes that have novelty, utility,
inventive ingenuity and are susceptible of industrial application. Methods of
playing games do not produce results in any way associated with trade,
commerce or industry, nor may they be, “worked on a commercial scale” as
required by Sections 66, 67, 68 and 69 of the Patent Act. Therefore it is not
in the public interest to grant patents for methods of playing games. Claims
1-35 are rejected.
Other than the last six words, the first sentence is a reasonable statement of
principle. However it lacks a basis for rejection under s 2. The “susceptibility of
industrial application” seems to be drawn from the EPC, rather than Canadian law.
The second sentence almost echoes Shell Oil, but instead of giving professional
judgement or skill as the issue, speaks of the unrelated issue of working on a com-
mercial scale. Finally, the Patent Act does not create a power to reject claims on the
basis of the Commissioner’s view of the public interest.
The PAB did not rely on British and Commonwealth cases as being authorita-
tive. Echoing Shell Oil, the PAB found that it “is now accepted that the invention is
the means and not the end”, but then, instead of applying the law from Lawson,
Tennessee Eastman, or Schlumberger, the PAB chose to cite Fox. Rather than fo-
cusing on the issues of human judgment and mental calculations, the PAB found
115 R v Patents Appeal Tribunal, [1962] 1 All ER 610, [1962] RPC 97 [Swift]. Correspond-
ing litigation in Swift’s Application occurred in both Australia and the UK, where pat-
ent eligibility was affirmed.
116 A similar statement is made in London Rubber Industries Ltd Patent, Re (1967), [1968]
RPC 31 [London Rubber], per Lloyd-Jacob, J: “In more recent times attention has been
directed to the importance of realising, in the light of the rapid development of science
and technology, that a widening conception of a manner of new manufacture may be
necessary if patent law is to continue to serve its primary purpose of encouraging de-
velopments in the useful arts.”(Emphasis added.)
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that: 
In carrying out this method there is no change in the character or condition
of material objects. It cannot be said that there are two elements — the pro-
cedure and the material to which it is applied. It is more of an abstract idea
directed to the means of playing a game, comparable to the rules of playing
golf, for example.117 (Emphasis added.)
As might be noted, the rejection was under s 2, not s 27(8). The “physical”
gloss issue has been discussed above. Given the licensing fees,118 it was certain the
claimed methods were neither an abstract idea nor lacking in practical application.
The PAB continued by pointing out that the method tilts the game in favour of the
house. While possibly true, it is irrelevant to any inquiry under the Patent Act. The
decision ends: 
Whether or not to choose to pay out using, for instance, the Ace-King com-
bination as the criterion, is, in the opinion of the Board, a combination of a
mathematical calculation of the odds of the appearance of a certain combi-
nation and what edge or advantage the Applicant wishes to give to the
house/banker. In other words Applicant’s method is the result of mere math-
ematical calculation rather than the exercise of the inventive faculty result-
ing in the discovery of some previously unknown advance in human knowl-
edge by the exercise of human intellect.119
The first sentence is correct, as are the first twelve words of the second sen-
tence. However the italicized portion is problematic. Subject-matter eligibility
under s 2 is not a prior-art based (i.e., “previously unknown”) test, i.e., a test of
scope.
On appeal, the FC equated processes with methods, and found both to be
“art”. The Court quoted the “disembodied idea” paragraph from Shell Oil, and
made the three-step distillation noted above. The court found the failure of the PAB
to consider the definition of the word “art” in Shell Oil to be legal error. However,
it may be recalled that Shell Oil was about the need to fit use into one of the statu-
tory class pigeon-holes. No such issue arose in Progressive Games.
The FC found that the method claims are “not simply a disembodied idea;
there is in fact a practical application as those changes involve the physical manipu-
lation of cards; . . .”. Yet the cards could have been virtual. They had no inherent
physical function. The FCA merely affirmed, without comment.
This is where the law stood prior to Amazon.com.
V. AMAZON.COM SEEKS A PATENT
(a) Background
On 11 September 1998, Amazon.com filed an application for a “Method and
System For Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communication Network”, now CA
2,246,933. Simply expressed, the application concerned an improved remotely-ac-
117 Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, Decision No 1290, In re: Application
2,246,933, 5 March 2009.
118 Progressive Games, supra note 64 at 18.
119 PAB, supra note 117.
162   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
cessible electronic cash register.120, 121 The claims relate to a “1-click” shopping
apparatus and method that facilitates sales to customers over the internet and that
eliminates several steps of more cumbersome previous systems by automatically
correlating customer payment and address data to a customer operated product se-
lection process. Appendix item 9 shows representative claims 1 and 44.
It is fundamental to peripheral claim drafting that the validity of a claim rests
only on its own claim language, and is not limited to a single embodiment shown or
described. According to the commentary provided by Amazon.com in the RMFL,
in a typical embodiment falling within the fence defined by the claims, the server is
a computer system used to operate a commercial Web site from which customers
can order products. The “client” is the computer system of a customer. The client
and server communicate with each other via a tele-communications network, such
as the Internet.122, 123 Provided there is such a communications system able to send
and receive, its nature is irrelevant.
When a client first visits a vendor’s website, the client enters identification,
billing and shipping information (purchaser-specific account information). The
server creates a “client identifier” for the client and stores it on the client’s com-
puter in a file called a cookie.124, 125 The nature of the cookie is irrelevant.
On a client’s subsequent visit to the Web site, the server recognizes the client
identifier located on the client’s computer as belonging to that client. The client
may then browse items and decide to buy an item by a single action (e.g., a single
mouse click on a “button” presented on a Web page).126
The single action sends the request to the server to order the item along with
120 Memorandum from the Attorney General of Canada & Commissioner of Patents (Ap-
pellant) and Amazon.com, Inc (Respondent) (3 March 2011) Appellants Memorandum
of Fact and Law, Court File No A-435-10 [AMFL].
121 The AMFL did not characterize its invention as a cash register. However, Ama-
zon.com’s own website employs a shopping cart icon, and a “proceed to check out”
process. The reference cited in prosecution by the Examiner was: “Creating the Virtual
Store”. A store, and its cash register, are clearly “things”. Further, both the specifica-
tion and the appellant’s MOFL in the FCA refer to the “shopping cart” model.
122 The internet is an example of such a network. In principle, it could be telegraph, a
semaphore or heliostat system, or signal flags. It need not be computer-operated, or
even that it be digital. It could, presumably, be analog.
123 Memorandum from the Attorney General of Canada & Commissioner of Patents (Ap-
pellant) and Amazon.com, Inc (Respondent), (4 April 2011) Respondents Memoran-
dum of Fact and Law, Court File No A-435-10 [RMFL].
124 Ibid, page 2, para 9.
125 A cookie is not conceptually so different from a numerically indexed, computer-acces-
sible Rolodex (tm), or a Christmas card address list. Nor is it so different from the
Royal Navy in Nelson’s day having code numbers for names, ships, ports, or frequently
used instructions, and storing flags for those code number, tied together beforehand, in
a pigeon-hole for quick use later. In its most basic form, the code numbers perform the
same function as the client identifier “cookie”. It could be flags, a punched code, a bar
code, a series of pre-set electro-mechanical relays or switches, or a set of optical or
electro-magnetic registers.
126 RMFL, supra note 123, page 3, para 10.
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the client identifier. The server receives the purchase request, retrieves the pur-
chaser-specific account information using the client identifier, and combines the
retrieved account information to generate the order. The result is that a user can
order an item through, e.g., a single mouse click, without having to provide addi-
tional information or to perform additional steps.127, 128
The claims on appeal were submitted to the Patent Office on 27 November
2002. After prolonged prosecution, all 75 claims were given a “Final” refusal on
two bases, namely obviousness under s 28.3 of the Patent Act, and lack of statutory
subject-matter under the definition of invention in s 2 of the Patent Act. This re-
fusal to grant a patent was upheld in 2009 by the PAB.129 It was agreed that the
invention was novel,130 and the PAB did not uphold the Examiner’s finding of
obviousness. Amazon.com appealed to Federal Court.
(b) The Rejections Before the Board — Obviousness
(i) Obviousness
All claims were rejected by the Examiner under s 28.3 of the Patent Act as
obvious given pages 118 to 121 and 326 of “Creating the Virtual Store” by M. Ye
il,131 in view of the common knowledge of a person of skill. The PAB overturned
the obviousness rejections. The 56 page PAB reasons include an 82 paragraph dis-
cussion132 of obviousness considering, at length, (a) the terminology of the claims,
and (b) the differences between the claims and the cited art.133, 134 The Board
made findings on the knowledge of persons skilled in the art — also citing Ye il as
an authority.135 The Board considered: “Web Tracking Terms”; “Collecting Cus-
tomer Information”; “Cookie Technology”; “Magic Cookies”. There was thus an
127 Ibid, page 3, para 11.
128 In earlier times, this might have been done with a single coded signal by a telegraph
key, or a telex keyboard. Now the remote signal interface is a computer terminal. It is
not the existence or use of a computer that is essential. It is the existence of a remotely
located sending and receiving station capable of sending the coded signal. Again, this
is not unlike a single flag or semaphore signal that “England” expects . . ., or perhaps
“come to my aid”. A single signal conveys a longer, more complicated message with-
out the cumbersome exercise of repeatedly sending the entire signal, one letter at a
time.
129 PAB, supra note 117.
130 Ibid at 94. There is no suggestion in the prior art to modify a subscription-based shop-
ping model such that with one click, an identifier (cookie) is sent in conjunction with
the product ordering information, thus retrieving purchaser-specific account informa-
tion, so that the order is instantly placed. [95] The advantages of such a streamlined
ordering process pointed out by the Applicant are indicative of some ingenuity (or in-
ventive step) . . .”
131 Magdalena Yesil, Creating the Virtual Store (np: John Wiley Sons, 1996).
132 Commencing at page 9, at para 27 and ending at page 32 para 109.
133 Commencing at page 17, paragraph 51 and continuing to page 22, paragraph 65.
134 Para 72 and para 73 to para 95.
135 Yesil, supra note 131 at pages 122, 112–115, 118, 121, 145-125, 113–115, and 112.
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extensive factual record on the meaning of claim terminology and differences from
the prior art. The detailed obviousness analysis proceeded without a preliminary
discussion of purposive construction. There was no suggestion interpretation was in
dispute.
(ii) Patentable Subject-Matter
The Examiner’s rejection for lack of patentable subject-matter under s 2 of the
Patent Act reads as follows: 
There is no new learning or knowledge contributed to the state of the art or
the prior art that is not already taught or known by Ye il and the Journal of
Design Science to the art of Internet technology. The underlying technical
features of the system remain the same. Adding the option to purchase an
item with a single-click is considered to be a mere change in the ordering
scheme or business model adhered to while using existing client/server sys-
tems. The single click is simply a feature within a common system, it is not
a system itself and it is done using common computer and Internet technol-
ogy. As such, the subject-matter of this application as a whole is not patent-
able under section 2 of the Patent Act.
Claims 1 to 45 and 51 to 75 describe methods for ordering items using a
computer system. None of these methods are a method of operating an in-
ventive machine or a method of manufacturing or building a vendible prod-
uct. The claims do not describe methods that produce an essentially eco-
nomic result in relation to trade, commerce, or industry, in the meaning
given those words by the Courts.136 The Office considers a method to pro-
duce an essentially economic result in relation to trade, commerce, or indus-
try, etc., when that method is a method of operation of an inventive machine
or when that method manufactures or construct a vendible product. None of
the methods described by these claims are a manual or productive art (they
are what have usually been labelled by the Courts as professional skills),
and none of these methods constitute “art” under section 2. The fact that
conventional computer systems are used to implement the item ordering
scheme (claims 46 to 50) does not change the nature of the subject-matter.
As stated by the Court, the fact that a computer is or should be used does
not add to nor subtract from the patentability of a discovery. A method that
does not produce an essentially economic result in relation to trade, etc.,
cannot be made patentable by merely having it carried out by a computer.
The subject-matter of claims 1 to 75 is therefore non-patentable, and is re-
jected under section 2 of the Patent Act.137
As can be seen, the first paragraph had attempted to base a rejection for lack
of subject-matter on issues of novelty and obviousness, not on issues of subject-
matter, and also spoke of “the subject-matter of this application as a whole is not
patentable”, rather than of the claims. By a letter to the Applicant of 30 July 2008,
136 The Examiner did not, apparently, cite any case law to support this comment.
137 Among the many points, Applicant’s reply correctly pointed out that the Examiner’s
commentary was really an attack on obviousness, and that the suggestion that the
claimed invention was non-commercial was without merit.
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the Board added: 
The Board is of the view that the rejection under Section 2 is based on
whether the essence of the claimed invention, or what has been added to
human knowledge (in this case: what has been added to online ordering
technology) is non-statutory because it does not fall into one of the catego-
ries of invention. This matter should be considered by the Applicant as an
entirely separate ground from the tests for novelty and/or obviousness.
In upholding this rejection, the PAB concluded:
1. That, per Lawson, a patentable art must cause a change in character or
condition of some object.138
2. Non-technological subject-matter is non-statutory (“Each of the five
categories of invention inherently relate to subject-matter that is techno-
logical in nature. It follows that subject-matter that is not technological is
not statutory subject-matter”.139 An “act or series of acts that do not con-
stitute a practical application of scientific or technological knowledge do
not fit the definition of a patentable art. A practical application of knowl-
edge necessarily implies an act or series of acts resulting in a change of
character or condition of a physical object”.140
3. Business methods are excluded subject-matter and are unpatentable in
Canada.141
The PAB did not suggest that purposive construction was not required, or dis-
pute the law of purposive construction. What the PAB did do, without reference to
purposive construction, was to add a test, apparently specific to s. 2, requiring inde-
pendent assessment of the “substance” of the claims:142 “The approach to assess
the substance is to fully understand the nature of the claimed invention, and deter-
mine what has been added to human knowledge”.143
(c) Decision of the Federal Court — Phelan J
The FC allowed Amazon.com’s appeal, comprehensively criticizing, and over-
turning, nearly every point of the refusal. The PAB’s reasoning was held “inappro-
priate and wrong in law”;144 and “many of the Commissioner’s errors stem from
her adoption of a policy role and the importation of policies not concordant with
138 PAB, supra note 117, p 38, under the heading “Change of character or condition”.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid, p 42, para 137.
141 Ibid, p 44, para 148.
142 Another incarnation of this approach is found in the “Inventive Concept” analysis pro-
posed by CIPO in the draft practice notices of 2 April 2012.
143 PAB, supra note 117, p 38. This must be an incorrect approach. Determination that
there is something added to human knowledge is a question of the content of prior art,
i.e., a question of, at least, novelty, not subject matter.
144 FC, supra note 5 at 36.
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Canadian law”.145 The court noted that “the Commissioner is . . . bound by Cana-
dian Patent regime and its interpretation by the courts”.146 The FC found that the
Commissioner’s two step “form and substance” and “what has been discovered”
approach “confusing and unnecessary” and “. . . a departure from the clear direction
of the Supreme Court to apply purposive construction universally”.147 The FC held
that: 
The Commissioner has simply adopted a novel legal test by which to assess
patentable subject-matter. It is not supported by recent Canadian jurispru-
dence or the Patent Act. This is an error of law and far outside the Commis-
sioner’s jurisdiction.148
Phelan J concluded: 
The absolute lack of authority in Canada for a “business method exclusion”
and the questionable interpretation of legal authorities in support of the
Commissioner’s approach to assessing subject-matter underline the policy
driven nature of her decision. It appears as if this was a “test case” by which
to assess this policy, rather than an application of the law to the patent at
issue.149
(d) Points of Law Nominally Upheld by the FCA
Citing Harvard Mouse,150 the FCA held that the grant of a patent was, without
discretion, entirely governed by the Patent Act, not public policy, and not by for-
eign laws as proposed by the AG. In the result the FCA nonetheless held that “The
Appeal is allowed, and the judgement of the Federal Court is set aside”, and also
held that “The appeal of Amazon.com, Inc, of the decision of the Commissioner of
Patents is allowed”. On each of the following points, and on the issues of the appli-
cable standards of review, the FCA seemed to uphold, the FC:
(1) it was legal error to adopt legal principles from foreign jurisdictions
(UK and EPC) where key differences exist in the legislation on patenta-
ble subject-matter;
(2) it was legal error to adopt a “form and substance” approach to claims
construction and to fail to apply the proper test set out in SCC and FCA
jurisprudence;
(3) it was legal error to apply an overly restrictive test for patentable “art”
and to fail to apply the proper test as set out in SCC and FCA
jurisprudence;
(4) there is no general exclusion in s 2 of otherwise patentable business
methods;
145 Ibid at 37.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid at 39.
148 Ibid at 47.
149 Ibid at 78.
150 Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, Bastarache J at
paras 144-145 [Harvard].
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(5) there is no “technological” test in Canadian jurisprudence;151
(6) even if there were a “technological” test, Amazon.com’s claims
would meet it;152
(7) there is no discretion under s.27(1) to refuse a patent if all require-
ments of the Act have been met;153
(8) it is the claims of a patent that are to be subject to purposive
construction;154
(9) in making a purposive construction one is not to parse claims into
their novel and obvious elements;155
(10) citing Shell Oil,156 that, to have patentable subject-matter the inven-
tion of a claim:
(i) must not be a disembodied idea but have a method of practi-
cal application;
(ii) must be a new and inventive method of applying skill and
knowledge; and
(iii) must have a commercially useful result;
(11) citing Progressive Games,157 it is not necessary for the material ob-
jects in question physically to change into another thing, but rather that
“practical application” can be satisfied in light of today’s technology
where there is a manifestation or effect or change of character.158
VI. THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
(a) The Issue on Appeal
The appeal concerned whether the Commissioner of Patents had grounds to
reject the Applicant’s claims under the definition of “invention” in s 2 of the Patent
Act, specifically whether the Applicant’s claims fall within one of the statutory cat-
egories of a “new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter.” That was the only issue on appeal, and thus the
only issue requiring an answer.
151 FCA, supra note 4 at paras 56–58. “In my view, this test should not be used as a stand-
alone basis for distinguishing patentable from non-patentable subject-matter”.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid at 27–31.
154 Ibid at 39–41, 47.
155 Ibid at 43.
156 Shell Oil, supra note 28, per Wilson J at 554-555.
157 Progressive Games, supra note 64.
158 FCA, supra note 4 at 66 but adding that “Justice Phelan is here acknowledging that
because a patent cannot be granted for an abstract idea, it is implicit in the definition of
invention that patentable subject-matter must be something with physical existence, or
something that manifests a discernible effect or change. I agree.”
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(b) How the Parties Framed the Appeal
On appeal the government framed the issues as:
(1) What, within the scope of the claims, have the inventors actually
invented?
(2) Does that invention fall within the statutory definition of “invention”?
Amazon.com framed the issues as:
(1) whether Phelan J erred in finding and applying the law of purposive
construction when construing the claims for the purpose of determining
whether those claims are directed to patentable subject-matter.
(2) whether Justice Phelan erred in finding and applying the test for pat-
entable “art” under the law.
(c) The Original Logic of the Commissioner’s Position
The Commissioner’s rejection was based on the proposition that the definition
in s 2 of the Patent Act includes an inherent exclusion, or prohibition, on the patent-
ing of “business methods”. (The term “business method”, itself, being nowhere de-
fined.) There was no rejection on appeal under any other section of the Patent Act.
In particular, there was no rejection under s 27(3); s 27(4); s 27(8);159 s 28.2; or s
28.3. The Commissioner, (i.e., PAB), had conceded that the invention was novel
and was not obvious. The PAB had to have construed the claims to find that they
were method claims.160 There was no dispute on appeal about any of these points.
Nor was there a dispute about the logical order of analysis. That is, the considera-
tion of whether “business methods”, as a class, were excluded subject-matter fol-
lowed after preliminary determination that the claims otherwise fell within one of
the enumerated classes of art, process, machine, manufacture, composition of mat-
ter, or improvement of any one of them.161
(d) The Commissioner’s Proposed Test Under s 2
The Commissioner did not nominally challenge the primacy of purposive con-
struction. However, at least for assessing subject-matter under s 2, another kind of
interpretation was also proposed, in which essential elements were to be identified
159 The Commissioner did not dispute patentability under s 27(8), at the PAB, before the
FC or before the FCA.
160 FC, supra note 5 at 24: “In considering the first step, she [i.e., the Commissioner]
refused to be limited by only the “grammatical sense” of the claims, as this would
prefer form over substance. She found that the method claims were in form related to a
process and the system claims in form to a machine. However, in substance the claims
were the same: both described a method.”
161 That this must be the logical order is reflected in repealed s 28(3). Before an “illicit
object” could be relevant the invention had to have been otherwise patentable. See s
28(3) “No patent shall issue for an invention that has an illicit object in view, or for any
mere scientific principle or abstract theorem.” RSC 1970, Ch P-4, s 28(3); current s
27(8) “No patent shall be granted for any mere scientific principle or abstract
theorem.”.
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and a determination made whether each fell within the statutory classes. The gov-
ernment argued, further, that there was a scientific or technological requirement,
but without a convincing basis in the Act or in case law.162 The AMFL acknowl-
edges that the Lower and Upper Canada statutes were based on the 1793 US Act,
but then says: “The Canadian statutes, on the other hand, must be understood in the
context of the British common law, according to which, it has been noted, the in-
ducement for the grant of a patent was and is “. . . the introduction of a new trade or
a new manufacture within the realm”.163
UK case law does not have greater force in law than the provisions of the
Canadian Patent Act. The object of the 1823 and 1826 Acts was explicitly the pro-
motion of the progress of the “useful arts”. The statutory classes did not change
with the post-Confederation Patent Act of 1869. Third, the words “to promote the
progress of Science and the useful Arts” do not merely identify the object of the US
Patent Act. They are (a) the words by which Congress is empowered to legislate in
respect of patents; and (b) the words by which the power of Congress is limited.164
Fourth, the AMFL contradicts London Rubber165 that the pre-1977 purpose of UK
patent law was the promotion of the useful arts. Fifth, Fox’s view, upon which the
AMFL relies, was ridiculed by the SCC in Tennessee Eastman.166, 167 The AMFL
162 AMFL, supra note 120 at 74 refers to “numerous references to the correspondence
between patentable inventions and technology”. AMFL fn 69 cites paras 150–161 of
the PAB decision. This argument might have been developed. However the AMFL
cites nothing of weight in Canadian law other than two phrases in Pope Appliance
Corp v Spanish River Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd, [1929] 1 DLR 209 (PC); and Tennessee
Eastman (Ex Ct); and a statement in Harvard Mouse that the Patent Act protects ad-
vances in technology, without defining what is, or is not, technological, and without
establishing that it excludes non-technological advances — a rather different point.
163 Ibid at 29, citing Harold George Fox, Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters
patent for Inventions, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1969) [Fox].
164 Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City, 383 US 1 (Mo, 1966) at 5.
165 See London Rubber, supra note 116 per Lloyd-Jacob J: “. . . if patent law is to continue
to serve its primary purpose of encouraging developments in the useful arts.”
166 Tennessee Eastman Co v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1972), [1974] SCR 111
at p 120 per Pigeon J.
167 In rejecting the reliance on the interpretation of “new manufactures” under the Statute
of Monopolies 1623, s 6 as found in Swifts Application, [1962] RPC 37, assessing stat-
utory subject-matter under s 2, Pigeon J wrote:
Counsel for the appellants heavily relied on [UK, NZ and Australian
decisions] . . . Concerning those cases, I would first observe that I
doubt whether decisions dealing with the patentability of inventions
under the U.K. Act are entitled in Canada to the weight which authors
such as Fox seem to think they should have. There are substantial dif-
ferences between the British and Canadian statutes which need not be
enumerated . . .” The full quotation continues: “In Hoffmann-Laroche
& Co Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [8], Kerwin CJ, . . ., said (at p
416): The difficulty in the appellant’s way is not only that the Act does
not so provide but s 2(d) and s 35(2) demand a negative answer. . . . as
to the English practice . . . in view of our statutory provisions that
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view was rejected by the SCC nearly forty years ago.168
Not only on this point was the AMFL enigmatic. For example, the assault on
purposive construction169 contrary to SCC precedent, was puzzling. The FC and
FCA had little difficulty rejecting the arguments made for a technological require-
ment, possibly because the AMFL seems not to have advanced a basis in law upon
which either Court could have found otherwise. The AMFL appears to have sought
to find a technological requirement170 variously in (i) the classes in s 2; (ii) the
PAB decision in Amazon.com at paras 150–161; (iii) the unsupported assertion that
holding “non-technological subject-matter is patentable would clearly represent a
radical departure from historical understandings”; (iv) a phrase in Tennessee East-
man; (v) the “technical problem and solution” of Rule 80(1)(d);171 and (vi) the
“Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.” The AMFL did not
mention that the requirements for subject-matter, written description, and that sub-
ject-matter be in “art or science” are found at the heart of the Act in ss 27(4), 27(3)
practice cannot be followed here. [Abridged] In Commissioner of
Patents v Winthrop Chemical Co Inc, Estey J noted at p 49 “the Cana-
dian Act is not modelled on the British Act”, Kellock J referred to the
meaning of the French version, a meaning that would be irrelevant on
the assumption that decisions respecting subject-matter under the Brit-
ish statute are controlling, Rand J said (at p 57):“the intention of a
legislature must be gathered from the language it has used and the task
of construing that language is not to satisfy ourselves that as used it is
adequate to an intention drawn from general considerations or to a
purpose which might seems to be more reasonable or equitable than
what the language in its ordinary or primary sense indicates.
168 Fox had written, at p 6, that “. . . in this sense [of the philosophic basis of the grant] the
patent law of Canada is a direct inheritance from the common law of England, and,
although it bears upon its face the impress of its borrowings from the United States
patent statutes, this is only a minor influence. That this view is sound is demonstrated
by the fact that the law of Great Britain is accepted as authoritative in interpreting that
patent law of Canada, save where the statutory provisions of the two countries have
diverged, and that United States decisions are accepted only on very particular points
where the relevant statutes make similar provision” citing Hunter v Carrick (1885), 11
SCR 300. Fox also cited Lord Tomlin in Rice, supra note 36: “It may be true that the
framers of the earlier Canadian statutes relating to patents looked for a model towards
the American law rather than towards the English law, but there are marked differences
between the American and Canadian statutes, and an examination of the development
of American patent law is not of assistance in construing the language of the statute
now under consideration.” Given that the relevant provisions were directly copied from
US law, Fox’s statement was not correct, and Pigeon J’s dry understatement followed.
169 Amazon.com, FCA, supra note 4 at 23.
170 AMFL supra note 120 at 74.
171 Rule 80(1): “The description shall (d) describe the invention in terms that allow under-
standing of the technical problem, even if it is not expressly stated as such, and its
solution.” Rule 80(1)(d) is, itself, curious as it seems to impose a substantive require-
ment not found within s 27(3).
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and 28.3,172 or rely upon the opinions, directly on point, by Stevens J and Mayer J
in Bilski in the USSC and Fed Cir, respectively, or upon any US decision interpret-
ing the language of the statutory classes and their meaning.
(e) The Intervener’s Submissions
The AMFL was filed on 3 March 2011. The RMFL was filed on 4 April 2011.
The RMFL was a model of draftsmanship, and might easily have been expected to
have carried the day. The Interveners, namely the Canadian Life and Health Insur-
ance Association and the Canadian Bankers Association, may have had a similar
view. On 8 April 2011 the FCA granted leave to intervene.173 The Amazon.com
result appears strongly to reflect the Interveners’ efforts.174
The Interveners’ memorandum of fact and law (IMFL) commences: “The In-
terveners start with the proposition that not “everything under the sun that is made
by man is patentable; and that ideas, mental steps, mental processes, schemes and
formulae are among the things under the sun that are not patentable.”
It was undoubtedly true. On this point there was unanimity in the SCC in
Harvard Mouse.175 However, Amazon.com had never advocated that “everything
under the sun that is made by man” was patentable.
The phrase “everything under the sun that is made by man” does not originate
in Canadian law, but in Congressional testimony on the 1952 US Patent amend-
ments, quoted out of context176 in Diamond v Chakrabarty.177 In Chakrabarty the
USSC ruled that the courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature had not expressed, and concluded that the words of
35 USC 101 were to be interpreted so expansively that they included everything
under the sun that is made by man — an interpretation that effectively cast aside
the wording of the statute, and the US Constitution.178
The end of the Intervener’s sentence is equally uncontroversial. It is plain that
ideas, mental steps, mental processes, schemes and formulae are not patentable
under Canadian law. Nobody suggested otherwise. Yet it was presented as if the
Respondent disagreed.
172 FCA, supra note 4 at 53, the Court chides the AG: “The focus should remain on princi-
ples to be derived from the jurisprudence”, and, presumably, the provisions and princi-
ples found in the Patent Act.
173 Decision of Trudel JA, 8 April 2011, (2011 FCA 127).
174 The fairness of allowing this intervention might be a subject for reflection. Third party
intervention in Canada is extremely rare, and especially so in cases before courts other
than the SCC. Here, the Interveners had no special connection to the case, and there
was no general call for other third parties to advance amicus curiae briefs that might
have balanced the Interveners’ submissions, or perhaps have provided a different view.
175 Interestingly, counsel for the Interveners was also counsel in Harvard Mouse, then ar-
guing for patentability.
176 See Bilski, supra note 3.
177 Diamond, supra note 1.
178 35 USC 101 does not say “everything under the sun”. It mandates explicit statutory
classes: “. . . any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, . . .”.
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The next sentence of the IMFL reads: “The Patent Act exhaustively defines
the limits of patentability in section 2.” Of course, (leaving aside ss 27(3), 27(4)
and 27(8)), that had been the Respondent’s strenuously argued position all along,
though it was not theretofore the position of the Commissioner. Yet it is presented
as if the Respondent disagreed.
The IMFL continued: “What is not included is excluded, and any extension of
new subject-matter should be left to Parliament.” Again, uncontroversial. The Re-
spondent took the same position. Throughout the IMFL the supposition is that to
allow Amazon.com’s claims is to extend the meaning of s 2 to new subject-matter,
to make s 2 include something that it did not include before.179 It raises the specter
of State Street.180
What the Respondent, Amazon.com, requested all along was that its claims be
interpreted according to the existing law. It did not request that the definition of s 2
be expanded, or changed. By contrast the Commissioner had argued throughout
that a new, inherent, exclusion of “business methods”, should be read into s 2. It
was the Commissioner who proposed a change in the law. Yet, in the IMFL, Ama-
zon.com was cast as attempting to extend s 2.181
In the next paragraph, paragraph 4, the Interveners submitted that if the deci-
sion of Phelan J were upheld the consequences would be dire: 
. . . the result would be to circumvent the accepted prohibition on the pat-
enting of ideas, or mental steps. . . . this could result in the patenting of:
(a) the methods, and steps involved in the creation, use, and
analysis of financial data;
(b) methods for managing financial portfolios and investments;
(c) methods for creating and managing insurance contracts;
(d) methods used to calculate risk and to analyze actuarial,
mortgage, or underwriting data;
(e) financial models and investment strategies;
(f) methods for conducting on-line banking; and
(g) accounting and tax schemes. (annotation and indentation
added.)
In paragraph 5, the Interveners say:
5. Under the test espoused in the Amazon.com decision [i.e., of the FC],
what would otherwise constitute purely mental steps, could be converted
into patentable subject-matter simply by the insertion of incidental or
known computer tasks as part of the patent claim. The adoption of this
test would put Canada into a legal position that is consistent with the U.S.
position post State Street, a position that was expressly rejected by the
179 See also paras 19 and 20. “The categories of patentable subject-matter would thus be
vastly extended . . .”
180 State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group Inc, 149 F 3d 1368 (Fed
Cir, 1998) [State Street].
181 On the point of “expanding” the law see Harvard Mouse per Binnie J at p 34, lines 35
et seq.
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U.S. Supreme Court . . . in Bilski.182
Paragraph 5 omitted to mention that it is already Canadian law that purely
mental steps are not patentable subject-matter. It is also already the law that mere
adoption of a computer will not turn unpatentable purely mental steps into patenta-
ble subject-matter — the one certain result of Schlumberger. If items are truly inci-
dental then they (a) cannot be “essential” elements of the claim; (b) cannot alter the
purposive construction of the claim into a different kind of subject-matter; (c) may
give rise to substantive rejections for obviousness; and (d) cannot yield a combina-
tion that is more than the sum of the parts anyhow. Nonetheless, the in terrorem
line was echoed in paragraphs 8 and 25 to 37.
Returning to paragraph 4 the assertion implied that Amazon.com’s claims
were merely ideas or purely mental steps — which had been consistently contra-
dicted by the findings of the examiner, the PAB, and the FC; and by the lack of any
rejection under s 27(8). The problem with Amazon.com’s claims was that they
were not purely mental steps or mere ideas. They were altogther practical: they
relate to an improved, remotely accessible, electronic cash register.
The fear mongering in paragraph 4 (repeated in paragraphs 9, 20 and 38(a),
and in footnote 21) is instructive. Items (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) are already non-
patentable subject-matter involving the exercise of professional judgement or skill.
Item (f) was a fear that the Interveners might have to pay a royalty to a patentee for
an improved, remotely-accessible electronic cash register. It is difficult to see a
basis in the Act for exempting either the banking or health insurance industries
from the claims of cash register patents simply because the cash registers are either
remotely accessible or electronic.
Paragraph 6 of the Interveners’ memo starts with “The interveners wish to
discuss the practical consequences of any test for subject-matter patentability and to
suggest a framework for such a test . . .” The “practical consequences” reference
invites exactly the result-oriented approach prohibited by Whirlpool.
In paragraph 7 the Interveners suggest that Schlumberger considers the ques-
tion of patentable subject-matter with reference to a computer. As discussed above,
in Schlumberger (a) the use of a computer to do calculations was obvious; and (b)
the use of a computer, or not, was irrelevant to patentability. In paragraph 12 the
Interveners asserted that Schlumberger held that “there is nothing new in using
computers to implement ideas.” That is not quite what Schlumberger says. Schlum-
berger says that using computers to do mathematical calculations is, alone, obvi-
ous — the same as it is obvious to use a shovel to dig, or a broom to sweep.
Although the only question formally before the court was whether s 2 of the
Act included a prohibition against “business methods” being patent-eligible, the
IMFL does not ever mention the term “business method”. The Interveners rather
slyly directed their commentary only toward, e.g., “computer implemented
steps”,183 and sought their exclusion from patentability as a class. However, “com-
puter implemented steps” can relate to: (a) the Schlumberger situation, where un-
patentable mental operations or processes could not be made more or less patenta-
182 Bilski, supra note 3.
183 See, for example, IMFL, page 3, para 7.
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ble by the obvious use of a computer; (b) true unpatentable methods of doing
business in the older sense, to which the inclusion or exclusion of a computer is
irrelevant; and (c) quite legitimate inventions that involve computers or software.
In this non-sequitur fog, the Interveners appear to have made a deftly-timed and
rather shrewdly judged invitation to the FCA to conclude that since (a) and (b) are
unpatentable, therefore any invention that involves computer implemented steps, as
in (c), must also be unpatentable.
There are three points to be made. All applicants, including Amazon.com,
have the right:
(i) to have the patentabilty of their claims determined under Canadian
law;
(ii) to have their claims assessed under the Patent Act, not some other
law; and
(iii) to have their patents granted, or not, on the basis of their own claims,
not the Bilski claims, not the State Street claims, not the claims of some
other US patent or abandoned Canadian application.184
Nearly the entire argument of the Interveners was not about the Amazon.com
claims, but about Bilski. The Interveners implicitly invited the Court to ignore ex-
isting law. The Interveners’ argument was nakedly results-oriented, and was largely
successful.
(f) The Result
On the appeal, the FCA held that there is no inherent statutory exclusion for
“business methods” under s 2 of the Patent Act. The FCA went further to:
(a) imply that all computer programs are merely unpatentable
algorithms;185
(b) find that “business methods” are not patentable unless found in a
combination with other “essential” elements of a claim;186
(c) find that although purposive construction is a matter of law, the Fed-
eral Court did not have a sufficient factual basis in evidence upon which
to make a purposive construction of the claims;187 and
(d) refuse, on the basis of (c), formally to answer the central question in
the case, namely whether the Amazon.com claims comprised patent-eli-
gible subject-matter under s 2 of the Act, and to return the question to the
Commissioner.188
The FCA decided the first issue as framed by the AG, pointing out that the
184 The IMFL did not provide the application or patent numbers of the examples at IMFL
paras 34 and 36.
185 FCA, supra note 4 at 63.
186 Ibid at 61.
187 Ibid at 71, 72 and 74.
188 Ibid at 72, 73 and 74.
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Commissioner’s duties are defined by the Patent Act, and noting that the Act re-
quires the Commissioner to examine the claims, rather than the “invention”.189
In respect of the second issue as framed by Amazon.com, the FCA agreed that
Phelan J had found the right test, but then diverged from that test and qualified its
determination as to whether the FC interpretation of the test was fully correct.190 In
respect of the first issue as framed by Amazon.com, the FCA did not decide
whether Phelan J had applied the test correctly, but, quite unexpectedly, reversed
instead not on the basis of an error of law, but rather on the ground that Phelan J
had erred in making his own purposive construction, at all, without, in the FCA’s
view, a sufficient factual basis. Finally, on the second ground framed by the AG,
the FCA refused formally to answer the question on appeal (the rejection under s
2), as the court was “unable to discern from the record what the Commissioner
would have concluded about the patentability of the claims in issue based on the
correct principles” and replaced the decision of the FC “with a judgment that al-
lows Amazon’s appeal of the Commissioner’s decision and requires the Commis-
sioner to re-examine the patent application on an expedited basis in accordance
with these reasons”.191 On this basis the FCA returned the case to the Patent
Office.
VII. COMMENTARY ON AMAZON.COM
(a) Factual Basis For Purposive Construction in the FC
The referral back to the Commissioner rested on FCA paragraph 72 reading, in
part: 
In my view, it was not appropriate for Justice Phelan to undertake his own
purposive construction of the patent claim in view of the available record in
this case. . . ..
(i) Facts Required to Construe Claims
The issue of whether the record provided a sufficient factual basis for making
a purposive construction was not briefed on appeal, and was not a ground of appeal
advanced by the Commissioner. It is neither mentioned in the AMFL, nor even in
the mischievous IMFL.
The FCA reasons in Amazon.com do not point to anything in the available
public record showing that (i) the claim terms were unclear; or (ii) there was doubt
about what the claim terms meant to persons of ordinary skill. There is no sugges-
tion that the Applicant, the Examiner, the PAB, the FC, or the FCA itself, had any
difficulty in understanding the meaning of the claims.
189 Ibid at 39–41. Even this has an equivocal gloss. See para 39, “That choice was made
for the following reasons.” and para 41 where the FCA finds “no reason why” patenta-
ble subject-matter, utility, and statutory exclusions should not refer to the claims — as
if by default only. Section 27(4) mandates that patents be granted for the claimed sub-
ject-matter. It is fundamental that the only “invention” is the one defined in the claims.
That is how the public knows where it is safe to tread.
190 Ibid at 69.
191 Ibid at 75.
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(ii) Explicit Findings Made by the PAB
Given that the court determined there is no general prohibition of “business
methods”, the only critical fact-dependent finding was whether the claims fit into
one of the enumerated classes of s 2 of the Act. On that issue, there must have been
a sufficient factual basis because the PAB itself made the explicit finding that the
claims were in substance method claims. If there had not been a Notice of Allow-
ance, would it have been open to the Commissioner to make a new, inconsistent,
finding that the claims are not, in substance, method claims?
(iii) Decision is a Glossary of Terms
FCA paragraph 73 commences: “Anyone who undertakes a purposive con-
struction on a patent must do so on the basis of a foundation of knowledge about
the relevant art, and in particular about the state of the relevant art at the relevant
time. . . .”
As noted above, the PAB decision ran 56 pages and included an 82 paragraph
discussion of obviousness. In discussing the Ye il reference, the PAB provided def-
initions and explanations for a wide range of pertinent terminology.192 Along the
way there is a discussion of each of the points of distinction raised in argument.193
There seems not to have been a lack of factual basis:
(i) in respect of the meaning of the terms as they would be understood by
a person of ordinary skill in the art; and
(ii) in respect of features considered essential to the patentability of the
claims under any construction, purposive or otherwise.
(iv) Summation on Shortage of Facts
The factual record provided in Decision of the Commissioner No 1290 is diffi-
cult to square with the holding by the FCA that there was insufficient factual basis
either (a) for the FCA to decide the issue under s 2; or (b) upon which Phelan J
could purposively construe the claims. Lack of sufficient factual basis to make the
necessary pre-requisite step of construing the clams does not seem to have impeded
either the examiner or the PAB.
(v) Consistent With Prior Cases?
There is no shortage of prior case law in which the FC has purposively con-
strued claim language. Can it be said all of those cases had a more developed fac-
tual record than in Decision 1290? Much was made in the Amazon.com appeal of
the Schlumberger case. However, there is no indication that Pratte J had the expert
evidence now required by the FCA in Amazon.com.
(b) Order-of-Operations under the Patent Act
FCA paragraph 38 reads “I do not propose to try to list all of the issues im-
192 Commencing at para 53 on page 18, and continuing, ultimately, to the conclusion in
respect of obviousness at paragraph 99 on page 28.
193 Commencing at para 72, and continuing to para 98.
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plicit in subsections 27(3), (4) and (8) and the statutory definition of “invention”
that must be considered by the Commissioner, but it seems to me that they would
include at least the following (which need not be considered in any particular or-
der): . . .” (Emphasis Added.)
The parenthetical portion appears to not to sit with SCC precedent: “The first
step in a patent suit is therefore to construe the claims. Claims construction is ante-
cedent to consideration of both validity and infringement issues”.194
The logic of the Act dictates that interpretation precedes substantive analy-
sis.195 The initial question must be whether the claims “define distinctly and in
explicit terms the subject-matter of the invention for which an exclusive privilege
or property is claimed”.196
Purposive construction comes before assessment of whether the claims meet
the patent-eligible subject-matter threshold of s 2;197 and before assessing whether
the subject-matter is excluded under s 27(8). Utility can be assessed either before or
after anticipation and obviousness. Anticipation under s 28.2, ought generally to
precede an analysis for obviousness under s 28.3 since a finding of anticipation
generally obviates the need for an assessment of obviousness. That is the logical
order of analysis under the Patent Act. There is only one purposive construction of
the claims for all purposes: “. . .However, it has always been a fundamental rule of
claims construction that the claims receive one and the same interpretation for all
purposes”.198
Purposive construction cannot be results-oriented: 
“(a) . . . A patent must not of course be construed with an eye on the alleg-
edly infringing device in respect of infringement or with an eye to the prior
art in respect of validity to avoid its effect: Dableh v Ontario Hydro, [1996]
3 FC 751 at pp 773-74 (CA). Claims construction cannot be allowed to
become a results-oriented interpretation, but there is nothing in Lord
Diplock’s speech that would support such an erroneous approach.”199
(Abridged, emphasis added.)
Amazon.com may have changed the law of (a) what constitutes “art” under s 2;
194 Whirlpool Corp v Camco Inc, [2000] 2 SCR 1067, 194 DLR (4th) 193.
195 If a claim is ambiguous, or indefinite, under s 27(4), and so cannot be interpreted, it
cannot be analysed for subject-matter, anticipation or obviousness Markman hearings
in the US also precede trials on validity and infringement. See 517 US 370, 116 S Ct
1384; 134 L Ed 2d 577; 1996 US LEXIS 2804; 64 USLW 4263; 38 US PQ 2d 1461; 96
Cal Daily Op Serv 2788; 96 Daily Journal DAR 4642; 9 Fla L Weekly Fed S 540.
However, courts in Canada have rejected the idea of holding separate Markman-style
hearings: Bourgault Industries Ltd v Flexi-Coil Ltd (1998), 80 CPR (3d) 1 (Fed TD);
aff’d (1999), 86 CPR (3d) 221 (Fed CA). Realsearch Inc v Valon Kone Brunette Ltd,
2004 FCA 5, [2004] 2 FCR 514.
196 Patent Act, supra note 7, s 27(4).
197 The evolving US approach appears to be that the 35 USC 101 subject-matter inquiry is
a low-threshold pre-requisite test that precedes inquiries under 35 USC 102, 35 USC
103, and 35 USC 112. This was the view of the majority per Newman J in Klassen v
Biogen (31 August 2011), although there is a dissent by Moore J.
198 Whirlpool, supra note 194 at 49.
199 Whirlpool, supra note 194 at 49, subpara (a).
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and (b) whether there is a “physicality” requirement under s 2, but resolution of that
issue could not alter SCC precedent governing purposive construction.
FCA paragraph 63 includes: “In my view, the task of purposive construction
of the clams in this case should be undertaken anew by the Commissioner, with a
mind open to the possibility that a novel business method may be an essential ele-
ment of a valid patent claim”.
Nothing about the downstream s 2 issues of whether algorithms or business
methods were “abstract”; or whether computer programs were merely mathematical
formulae could have had any effect on the upstream question of whether the claims
had been correctly purposively construed. A change in the law of patentable sub-
ject-matter under s 2 could not then require (a) the taking of additional evidence; or
(b) a new, different, purposive construction of the claims. Yet the FCA decision in
Amazon.com suggests that a change in law pertaining to a downstream issue (as-
sessment under s 2) affects a prior upstream occurrence (purposive construction),
apparently contrary to both the statute and Whirlpool.
(c) Purposive Construction — “Grounded in” the Claims
In paragraph 43 the FCA acknowledges that the SCC in Free World Trust and
Whirlpool, “requires the Commissioner’s identification of the invention be
grounded in a purposive construction of the patent claims.” (Emphasis added.)
At the same time, notwithstanding s 27(4), according to FCA paragraph 42,
while the Commissioner must examine the subject-matter defined by the claims this
“does not mean that the Commissioner cannot ask or determine what the inventor
actually invented, or what the inventor claims to have invented. On the contrary,
these are relevant and necessary questions in a number of contexts, including nov-
elty, obviousness and patentable subject-matter. . . .”
The Commissioner’s powers and duties are defined exhaustively by the Patent
Act. Under s 27(2) it is the inventor or the inventor’s legal representative who must
meet the requirements of the Act under s 27(1). The requirement for claims is estab-
lished by s 27(4). The exclusive property or privilege is claimed by the applicant,
who is required (a) to submit the specification; (b) to end the specification with
claims; and who is entitled (c) to the grant of a patent under s 27(1) if the require-
ments of the Act are met.
The Commissioner is not empowered by the Act to decide what the invention
is.200 The Commissioner’s duty is to determine whether the requirements of the Act
have been met in respect of the claims as presented by the applicant. The entire
inquiry starts with, and is driven by, the subject-matter of the invention as claimed
by the applicant. Seeking the “actual” invention is irrelevant to, and outside of, the
Commissioner’s duties and powers under the Act.
The SCC requires purposive construction of the claims. The law does not re-
quire interpretation of an invention “grounded in” the claims, but rather purposive
construction of the invention “in” the claims, consistent with the requirement of s
200 When the court in, e.g., Consolboard, supra note 11, says that the first step in construc-
tion is to decide what has been invented, the court is asking “what is the invention in
this claim?” i.e., the claim presented by the Applicant. It is not the Commissioner’s
duty, or right, to draft the Applicant’s claims.
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27(4). Free World Trust says: 
The claims language will, on purposive construction, show that some ele-
ments of the claimed invention are essential and others are non-essential.
The identification of elements as essential or non-essential is made:
. . .
(iv) according to the intent of the inventor, expressed or inferred
from the claims, that a particular element is essential, irrespective
of its practical effect;
(v) without, however, resort to extrinsic evidence of the inven-
tor’s intention. (Emphasis added.)
See Whirlpool:201 “[t]he key to purposive construction is therefore the identi-
fication by the court, with the assistance of the skilled reader, of the particular
words or phrases in the claims that describe what the inventor considered to be the
“essential” elements of his invention.” (Emphasis added.)
While the claims must be read in the context that would be understood by a
person of ordinary skill having read the specification as a whole, it is contrary to
law to rely on the specification to define the essential elements of an invention: “If
the words of the claim are plain and unambiguous it will not be possible to expand
or limit their scope by reference to the body of the specification. In such a case
“recourse to the body of the specification for explanation, qualification or extension
is neither required nor is legitimate”.202
Courts have said “resort to the specification is limited to assisting in compre-
hending the meaning of words or expressions contained in the claim but not to
changing the meaning; . . .”203 (Emphasis added.) In construing the claims in a pat-
ent recourse to the remainder of the specification is (a) permissible only to assist in
understanding terms used in the claims; (b) unnecessary where the words of a claim
are plain and unambiguous; and (c) improper to vary the scope or ambit of the
claims”.204
The issue is what the inventor claimed the subject-matter of his invention to
be, as required by statute.
(d) Practicality and Physicality in the FCA and in the FC
The issue of relative emphasis to put on practicality and physicality was
highly contentious, with the FC favouring practicality, and the FCA emphasizing
physicality.
According to FCA paragraph 71: 
As I understand Justice Phelan’s construction of claims 1 and 44, he
adopted what is essentially a literal construction, based on his conclusion
that the requirement of physical existence or manifestation of a discernible
201 Whirlpool, supra note 194 at 45.
202 Kramer v Lindsay Specialty Products Ltd (1986), 9 CPR (3d) 297 (Fed TD) at 310.
203 (Reliance Electric Industrial Co v Northern Telecom Ltd (1993), 47 CPR (3d) 55 (Fed
TD) at pp 61-61; Hi-Qual Manufacturing Ltd v Rea’s Welding & Steel Supplies Ltd
(1994), 55 CPR (3d) 224 (Fed TD) at 241.
204 Procter & Gamble Co v Calgon Interamerican Corp (1982), 61 CPR (2d) 1 (Fed CA).
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effect or change implicit in the statutory definition of “invention” was met
because use of a computer is an essential element of the claim.
This may be compared with the reasons of Phelan J at FC paragraphs 73 and
75: 
The court finds that a purposive construction of the system claims (e.g.,
claim 44 and its associated dependent claims) clearly discloses a machine
which is used to implement Amazon.com’s one-click ordering system. The
described components (e.g., a computer) are essential elements in imple-
menting an online ordering process. This is not merely a mathematical
formula” which could be carried on without a machine, or simply a com-
puter program. . . .
And at FC paragraph 75: . . . 
The new learning or knowledge is not simply a scheme, plan, or disem-
bodied idea; it is a practical application of the one-click concept, put into
action through the use of cookies, computers, the internet and the cus-
tomer’s own action. Tangibility is not an issue. The “physical effect”, trans-
formation, or change of character resides in the customer manipulating their
computer and creating an order. (Emphasis added.)
The term “physicality requirement” was introduced in FCA paragraph 65, in
discussing Phelan J’s analysis of Lawson. Discarding the “apparent to the senses”
portion of the famous paragraph in Lawson, FCA para 65 abbreviates the test to
“physicality requirement”. What Phelan J said was: 
The practical application requirement ensures that something which is a
mere idea or discovery is not patented — it must be concrete and tangible.
This requires some sort of manifestation or effect or change of character.
However it is important to remain focused on the requirement for practical
application rather than merely the physicality of the invention. The lan-
guage of Lawson must not be interpreted to restrict the patentability of prac-
tical applications which might, in light of today’s technology, consist of a
slightly less conventional “change in character” or effect that [is effected]
through a machine such as a computer.205 (Emphasis added.)
As can be understood from the commentary on Lawson, even at the outset,
discussion of “practicality” and “physicality” in Amazon.com was based on two
misconceptions. The first was that there was, or is, a competition between “practi-
cality” and “physicality”. To repeat, “practicality” is a requirement of a completed
act of invention. “Physicality” related to Robinson’s discussion of “art” as a statu-
tory class pigeon-hole. These are unrelated questions. Second, “physical” was
Robinson’s gloss, not found in Cochrane v Deener; and, even without the gloss,
Cochrane v Deener is itself no longer good law. Thus the discussion of “physical-
ity” was based on mistaken assumptions.
(e) Business Methods, Computer Software and Abstract Ideas
FCA paragraph 61 addresses business methods: 
. . . it does not necessarily follow, as Justice Phelan seemed to suggest, that
a business method that is not itself patentable subject-matter because it is an
205 FC para 53.
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abstract idea becomes patentable subject-matter merely because it has a
practical embodiment or a practical application. In my view this cannot be a
distinguishing test, because it is axiomatic that a business method always
has, or is intended to have, a practical application.
Phelan J was writing about cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Com-
missioner as non-patentable business methods. Phelan J pointed out that they were
found to be non-patentable subject-matter “[not] because they were business meth-
ods, but because they were “mere schemes” or disembodied ideas. To put it in a
Canadian context, they did not have a practical application. In this sense a mere
business scheme will have no practical embodiment and, like any other abstract
idea or theorem, will of course be non-patentable. That is not the case with the
business method claimed in the present case.”
What Phelan J was saying was that a practical application is a necessary, but
not necessarily sufficient, condition for the existence of patentable subject-matter,
following Wilson J in Shell Oil.206 Phelan J also apparently recognized that “busi-
ness method” is not a term synonymous with “mere schemes” but that methods of
doing business in previous case law included species of “mere schemes”. As seen
above, though, the rationale for excluding “mere schemes” of doing business is that
they do not pertain to art or science. The rationale for excluding “disembodied
ideas” is that they do not constitute a completed inventive act. As in previous cases,
separate issues have been intermingled.
FCA paragraph 61 continues: 
And in this case, the difficulty with a bare “practical application” test for
distinguishing patentable from unpatentable business methods is highlighted
because the particular business method — itself an abstract idea — is real-
ized by programming it into the computer by means of a formula or al-
gorithm, which is also an abstract idea.
First, this portion of paragraph 61 reflects the same confusion of issues. “Prac-
tical application” concerns the act of invention, not whether a “business method”
falls within a statutory pigeon-hole under s 2. Second, as discussed, Phelan J did
not articulate a “bare” practical application test. He followed Shell Oil. Third, the
finding that “the particular business method”, [of Amazon’s claims], is “itself an
abstract idea” is odd. Neither the Examiner nor the Board treated it as an abstract
idea when examining for obviousness, but rather as something rather workaday,
practical, and pragmatic. The finding is made despite FCA paragraph 60: The [AG]
. . . has not denied that the Commissioner has granted patents for claims similar to
those in issue in this case. At the pertinent time the Commissioner had admitted
there was no blanket prohibition on business methods.207
206 Shell Oil, supra note 28 at p 549 quoted by Phelan J at FC para 50.
207 See FC, supra note 5 para 62 “On the contrary, it seems that until quite lately the
Patent Offices’s policy was to grant patents for business methods so long as they were
an art within the meaning of section 2 of the Patent Act. The previous [MOPOP],
12.04.04 (re v Feb 2005) stated that business methods are “not automatically excluded
from patentability, since there is no authority in the Patent Act or Rules or in the juris-
prudence to sanction or preclude patentability based on their inclusion in this cate-
gory”. The manual required that they be assessed like any other invention. The evi-
dence indicates this practice was followed.”
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If the holding that the business method in the claims in question “is realized
by programming it into the computer by means of a formula or algorithm, which is
also an abstract idea.” i.e., and therefore unpatentable, is combined with (a) the
holding that the “particular business method” of Amazon’s claim is not patentable
as an abstract idea; and further combined with (b) “it is implicit in the definition of
“invention” that the patentable subject-matter must be something with physical ex-
istence, or something that manifests a discernible effect or change”,208 then there
seems to have been little left in Amazon’s claims to hold patentable.
The effect on the patentability of software is seen again in paragraphs 67–69.
“I do not necessarily accept” says Sharlow JA, Phelan J’s statement, quoted above,
that “The language in Lawson must not be interpreted to restrict the patentability of
practical applications which might, in light of today’s technology, consist of a
slightly less conventional “change in character” or effect through a machine such as
a computer.”
“If these statements are meant to suggest that our understanding of the nature
of the “physicality requirement” as described in paragraph 66 above may change
because of advances in knowledge, then I would agree.” It continues:209 “The
claims in Schlumberger were not saved by the fact that they contemplated the use
of a physical tool, a computer, to give the novel mathematical formula a practical
application.”
(f) Two Choices
FCA paragraphs 62 and 63 are central to the FCA decision in Amazon.com.
They read in relevant parts: 
[62] Schlumberger exemplifies an unsuccessful attempt to patent a method
of collecting, recording and analyzing seismic data using a computer
programmed according to a mathematical formula. That use of the computer
was a practical application, and the resulting information was useful. But
the patent application failed for want of patentable subject-matter because
the Court concluded that the only novel aspect of the claimed invention was
the mathematical formula which, as a “mere scientific principle or abstract
theorem”, cannot be the subject of a patent because of the prohibition in
subsection 27(8).
[63] It is arguable that the patent claims in issue in this case could fail on the
same reasoning, depending upon whether a purposive construction of the
claims in issue leads to the conclusion that Schlumberger cannot be distin-
guished because the only inventive aspect of the claimed invention is the
algorithm — a mathematical formula — that is programmed into the com-
puter to cause it to take the necessary steps to accomplish a one-click online
purchase. On the other hand, it is also arguable that a purposive construction
of the claims may lead to the conclusion that Schlumberger is distinguisha-
ble because a new one-click method of completing an online purchase is not
the whole invention but only one of a number of essential elements in a
novel combination. In my view, the task of purposive construction of the
claims in this case should be undertaken anew by the Commissioner, with a
208 FCA, supra note 4 at para 66.
209 Ibid at 68.
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mind open to the possibility that a novel business method may be an essen-
tial element of a valid patent claim.
As seen above, contrary to FCA paragraph 62, there was no rejection under s
27(8) in Schlumberger, and there was no mathematical formula in the Schlum-
berger claims. The use of a computer was not relevant to the outcome. The calcula-
tions in Schlumberger had a practical, technological, application with or without
the computer. The rejection was upheld on the basis of the claims being directed to
purely mental operations or processes.
Paragraph 63 establishes two choices. Under the first choice, which would
have excluded Amazon’s claims outright under s 2, computer programs and algo-
rithms are both equated with mathematical formulae; and the Court indicates that
since all mathematical formulae (and therefore all computer programs and algo-
rithms) are merely scientific theorems or abstract ideas no claim that is a computer
program, or algorithm, can, alone, constitute patent eligible subject matter. Under
the second choice, the claim could be patent eligible, but only if the method of
completing an online purchase were not the whole invention, but only one of a
number of essential elements in a novel combination. Given FCA paragraph 61 and
the conclusion of para [63], neither the business method nor the computer could,
alone, define essential features on which patentability could rest, the FCA seemed
also to have foreclosed the second choice.210 Largely incorporating the approach of
the Commissioner,211 by indicating that some elements (business methods and
computer program, for example) might be essential elements for some purposes,
but not for others (such as subject-matter eligibility), the FCA also implicitly en-
dorsed a two-step element-by-element interpretation exercise for assessing subject-
matter eligibility despite acknowledging that purposive construction is required by
law.212 There is no requirement that a claim have more than one “essential” ele-
ment. The issue is whether the subject-matter defined by the claim as a whole
meets the requirements of the Act.
Methods, by themselves, have been patentable without the inclusion of physi-
cal apparatus for over 200 years. The court in Watt’s steam engine cases213 indi-
cated that patents for mere methods had existed for many years prior to 1795. Yet
in Amazon.com the FCA suggests that some kinds of methods — namely “business
methods” — cannot stand alone, and must include apparatus. While making such a
distinction, though, the FCA does not indicate how to differentiate a “business
method” from any other method.
This is the problem identified by Stevens J in Bilski. On the parallel point in
Bilski the majority took the position that: 
The concept of hedging, . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the
210 That a Notice of Allowance would issue, preventing appeal to the SCC — seems not to
have been foreseen. The reason why a Notice of Allowance issued therefore remain
unknown. Unlike the US, there are no “reasons for allowance”, so there is no public
record on the issues the Commissioner was instructed to address by the FCA.
211 FCA, supra note 4 at paras 61–63.
212 Ibid at 43 and 47.
213 Boulton & Watt v Bull (1795), 2 H Bl 463, 126 ER 651; Hornblower v Boulton (1799),
8 Term Rep 95.
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algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. Allowing petitioners to patent risk
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effec-
tively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.
The statement implies that the nature of the subject-matter claimed might have
changed to become patent-eligible if restricted to hedging a single commodity of a
single source at a single place, to avoid pre-emption, as if nature is a question of
breadth. However, the problem with Bilski’s claim was neither that it was abstract,
nor an issue of breadth, but rather that it could not reasonably be interpreted as
falling within the “useful Arts”. Stevens J wrote: 
The patent before us is not for a principle, in the abstract, or a fundamental
truth. . . . Nor does it claim the sort of phenomenon of nature or abstract
idea . . . The court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what con-
stitutes an unpatenable abstract idea . . . The Court essentially asserts its
conclusion . . . This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the
correct outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on
this issue stand for very little.214
In summary, arbitrarily stretching the word “abstract” to encompass subject-
matter that is plainly not abstract cannot be a correct solution.
The Amazon.com claims concerned an improved cash register, and way of op-
erating a cash register. Several old functions were combined in one convenient
place and method of operation. It was completely automatic — it did not involve
human skill or judgment. The elements of the claims could hardly have been more
commonplace or mundane. Every element had at least one, and usually several,
very well-known, and long-known, mechanical or electro-mechanical equivalents.
That it was practical, had commercial application, and was clearly understood, is
undoubted. The Patent Office conceded that the claimed combinations were new,
and not obvious. There was no suggestion by the Office that it was theoretical or
abstract.
The FCA in Amazon.com concluded that Schlumberger stands for the proposi-
tion that anything programmed into a computer is unpatentable as a “formula or
algorithm, itself an abstract idea”,215 and applied that conclusion to the Ama-
zon.com claims.
Schlumberger stands for the proposition that using a computer to do calcula-
tions that are mere mental processes makes them neither more nor less patentable.
If every algorithm is merely “a scientific principle or abstract idea” then no
software is patentable in itself. That seems a dubious proposition.216 Some
214 Bilski, supra note 3, per Stevens J at pp 8-9.
215 FCA, supra note 4 at para 61.
216 See the US case Application of Chatfield, 545 F 2d 152, 191 USPQ 730 (Cust & Pat
App, 1976), cited with approval In re Iwahashi, 888 F 2d 1370 (Fed Cir 1989): “Over-
concentration on the word “algorithm” alone, for example, may mislead. The Supreme
Court carefully supplied a definition of the particular algorithm before it [in Benson],
i.e., “[a] procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem.” The broader
definition of algorithm is “a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accom-
plishing some end.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1976). . . . It would be un-
necessarily detrimental to our patent system to deny inventors patent protection on the
sole ground that their contribution could be broadly termed an “algorithm”.
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software may involve millions of lines of code, and as much engineering as it took
a century ago to design a locomotive. Neither the Commissioner nor the PAB relied
upon any such broad ground of exclusion in respect of software in making the re-
jection, and it was not an issue on appeal. To conclude that doing calculations by
computer, alone, is unpatentable, and therefore the use of a computer cannot make
anything else patentable would exclude from patentability inventions such as found
in the US Chatfield217 case.
Finally, the FCA was uncertain that the claims in Amazon.com were distin-
guishable from those in Schlumberger: “As explained above, the claims in issue in
this case may or may not be distinguishable from the claims in Schlumberger, de-
pending on how they are construed”.218
The claims in Schlumberger were about purely mental calculations. The com-
puter was used to do calculations, which, in Diehr-like fashion, Pratte J found to be
obvious. The claims in Amazon.com were about a remotely accessible electronic
cash register and a method of operating that cash register. The computer in Ama-
zon.com was not used for calculations but as a sending and receiving terminal that
(temporarily) stores information. It could be replaced by a telegraph key, a code
book, a pad of paper and a pencil.219 The comments in Schlumberger concerning
calculations and formulae were not relevant to Amazon.com.
(g) “Solely on the basis of the inventive concept”
In paragraph 47, the FCA states: “I agree with Justice Phelan that in determin-
ing subject-matter solely on the basis of the inventive concept, the Commissioner
adopted an incorrect analysis in law.” (Emphasis added.)
The issue of concern to Phelan J was not that the Commissioner had deter-
mined subject-matter “solely” on the basis of the “inventive concept”. Phelan J ob-
jected to the Commissioner’s proposition that “a claimed invention is not patenta-
ble if what makes it new and unobvious comprises non-statutory subject-
matter”,220 leading to the proposition that “an analysis of patentability of what is
217 Even the CIPO draft practice notice of 2 April 2012 implicitly recognized this point.
See “Statutory Subject Matter under the Patent Act”, CIPO, 2 April 2012, page 3,
“Computer-implemented inventions”, third paragraph.
218 FCA, supra note 4 at 69.
219 Application of Chatfield, 545 F 2d 152. Chatfield’s claim was to a method of operating
a computer more efficiently by allowing the computer to process several programs with
dynamically changing priority. A similar Canadian example is Honeywell Information
Systems Inc, Re (1986), 13 CPR (3d) 462 (Can Pat App Bd & Pat Commr) now CA
1,216,072. In Chatfield, the claim had been rejected as to an algorithm, and therefore
unpatentable. The CCPA reversed. The method of operating the machine more effi-
ciently did not become unpatentable simply because it was called an “algorithm”. See
Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175 (1981) at 187: “Our earlier opinions lend support to our
present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject-matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer pro-
gram, or digital computer.” According to Diehr, the “purely mental steps” prohibition
no longer exists in US law.
220 FC, supra note 5 at 14.
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new, apart from the invention as a whole, is required”.221 He rejected the Commis-
sioner’s return to an inquiry of “what has been discovered” as being “confusing,
unnecessary, and a departure from the clear direction of the Supreme Court to ap-
ply purposive construction universally”.222
Phelan J wrote: “It is thus not wrong to speak of “what has been invented” so
long as this is determined with reference to the essential elements as disclosed
through purposive construction of the claims, rather than a subjective, secondary
consideration by the Patent Office as to the “substance of the invention”.223 As
discussed above, it is problematic to suggest that “what has been discovered”
stands apart from the claims as a whole. This is particularly so where the Commis-
sioner has found that what is claimed is novel . . . and not obvious.224 It is contrary
to settled law to purport to look at “what was invented” and “substance” by failing
to look at the invention [i.e., of the claims] as a whole”.225
Phelan J objected to any reliance on finding an invention outside of the
claims.226 Further, the Commissioner had not relied upon “inventive concept” as a
basis for rejection for lack of statutory subject-matter under s 2. The only reference
by the PAB to “inventive concept” related to the Examiner’s obviousness rejec-
tion — which the PAB overturned.
(h) “Inventive Concept”
By coincidence the USSC has used the terminology “inventive concept” in the
recent decision of Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. It
appears that the USSC meaning, (pertaining to the existence of an act of invention),
is not the same as the UK meaning of “inventive concept”, (pertaining to patenta-
bility over prior art), and, consequently, future confusion may be expected when
reference is made to either. Further still, neither the UK term “inventive concept”
nor the US term “inventive concept” has the same meaning as “single general in-
ventive concept” in Rule 36 of the Patent Rules and hence under s 36 of the Patent
Act (whether the claims permit a single search). Each of these meanings of “inven-
tive concept” is distinct, and is used for a different purpose. It is important that they
not be confused.
The origin of the UK “inventive concept” found in Amazon.com227 lies in
Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd.228 The issue
was whether a windsurfer design was obvious. There was no subject-matter issue.
The holding in Windsurfing was subsequently corrected, in part, in Pozzoli SpA v
221 FC, ibid at 15.
222 FC, ibid at 39.
223 FC, ibid at 40.
224 FC, ibid at 42.
225 FC, ibid at 43.
226 Phelan J did not use the term “inventive concept” at all.
227 FCA, supra note 4 at 47; FC discussion at paras 40–44, 58; and PAB paras 73, 100,
101.
228 Windsurfing International Inc v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd (1984), [1985] RPC
59 [Windsurfing].
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BMDO SA.229 Pozzoli was cited by the SCC in Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc v
Apotex Inc.230 Unfortunately this relied on UK statutory language, not the language
of the Canadian Patent Act. The relevant UK provision was s 32(1)(f) of the UK
Patents Act (1949). However, the terminology “inventive step” has crept into Cana-
dian jurisprudence, both before231 and after232 the enactment of s 28.3, perhaps
without receiving appropriate scrutiny.
In Windsurfing, “inventive concept” was incorrectly equated to “inventive
step,”233 a prior-art-based exercise,234 not a subject-matter inquiry. The Windsurf-
ing headnote placed the steps in an easily copied, numbered, sub-paragraph format,
facilitating the spread of the errors. Pozzoli tried to limit the damage by pointing
out that the “inventive concept” analysis is, ultimately, optional, and dispensable.
Despite the statement in Pozzoli that “it is not even practical to try to identify a
concept” in a chemical claim,235 the “inventive concept” four step test has been
cited in subsequent Canadian drug litigation. The Pozzoli “inventive concept” is not
relevant to the upstream question of whether subject-matter is statutory, an issue
decided before consideration of prior art.
In Sanofi the SCC adopted the Pozzoli formulation of the four step Windsurf-
ing test. The issue in Sanofi was whether “obvious to try” exists in patent law in
Canada. In subsequent cases the “inventive concept” terminology has been used in
the context of obviousness analyses. It was used by the PAB in Amazon.com only
in this way.236
As noted above, in Amazon.com the Commissioner did not make the subject-
matter rejection on the basis of inventive concept, in the FC there was no discus-
sion of “inventive concept” and at the FCA the court found it to have been incorrect
in law to have determined “subject-matter solely on the basis of the inventive con-
cept”.237 However, the term “inventive concept” was central to the new examina-
tion guidelines for patent-eligible subject-matter proposed by CIPO on 2 April
2012.
“Inventive concept”, intended to be equivalent to “inventive step” under UK
law, is based on an error in UK case law. It has no basis in the Canadian statute,
and appears to be contrary to the requirements of s 27(4). It creates potential confu-
sion with the requirement of purposive construction and perpetuates the confusion
229 Pozzoli SpA v BMDO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ 588 [Pozzoli].
230 Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc v Apotex Inc, [2008] 3 SCR 265, 2008 SCC 6.1
[Apotex].
231 Skelding v Daly, [1941] SCR 184 seems to be an early example.
232 Apotex, supra note 230, is but one of many recent examples.
233 See Windsurfing, supra note 228 at p 71, lines 30–35.
234 Ibid, page 67, lines 16–18.
235 Pozzoli, supra note 229, at para 20.
236 The PAB obviousness analysis in Amazon.com runs from para 41–109. “Inventive con-
cept” appears only in paras 73, 100 and 101. It does not appear after para 101. Patent-
eligible subject-matter commences at para 110 and runs to para 195.
237 The Commissioner did rely on another four step test for making the subject matter
rejection: that of Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd, [2006] EWCA Civ 1371, which the
FC held to have no basis in Canadian law.
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of issues of subject-matter under s 2 with issues of obviousness under s 28.3. It has
great potential to cause confusion with (a) “inventive concept” under US law; and
(b) “single general inventive concept” under Rule 36, each of which has a different
meaning. Its history in Pozzoli is unrelated to analysing patentable subject-matter
on a first principles basis. It does not appear to serve a useful purpose in Canadian
law.
(i) Order of Analysis
Examination as required by law starts and ends with the claims. The Patent
Act, and every determination of validity and infringement, is based on the claims
defining the invention. The law requires that claims be read in their entirety and as
a whole. The law prohibits both (i) reading features into a claim, and (ii) reading
features out of a claim. This serves the public notice function.
Canada has a peripheral claiming system, not a sign-post system. The claim
language defines the “fence”. In a peripheral claiming system, there can be no basis
in law for an “invention” other than as found in the claims, and only in the claims.
Were it otherwise, how could the public know where it is safe to tread? The sug-
gestion that there is some “other” invention is inconsistent with the language of the
Patent Act.
The Act requires that the claims be supported by the specification. S 27(3)
says “The specification of an invention must . . .” Thus every requirement of the
specification is referenced to the claimed invention. To make this assessment it is
necessary to start with the claims, and then determine whether the claimed inven-
tion is supported by the specification as required by sub-sections (a)–(d) of s 27(3).
The approach of the Patent Office, given life by the FCA in Amazon.com, is to
decide by reading the specification what the “actual” invention is, and then to see if
the claims conform to the claims as the Commissioner would have drafted them.
This approach is the opposite of what is required by the Patent Act, and is outside
the powers of the Commissioner.
(j) The Role of the Commissioner
Consider FCA paragraph 27: “. . . The object of the Commissioner’s examina-
tion of a patent application, understood in its broadest possible sense, is to deter-
mine whether the terms of the bargain [i.e., between the inventor and the public]
are met. That determination requires the Commissioner to interpret and apply the
Patent Act.”
The Commissioner’s powers and duties are defined, exhaustively, by the Pat-
ent Act.238 The object of the Commissioner’s examination is not to determine
whether the public bargain has been met, but whether the Applicant has met the
requirements of the Act for the grant of a patent. That duty is defined by s 27(1) and
s 40. While perhaps little different in outcome, it is greatly different in concept: a
vague general idea as opposed to the rule of law.
Similarly, consider FCA paragraph 33: “In a certain sense, when the Commis-
sioner is assessing a patent application under subsection 27(1) to determine whether
238 Patent Act, supra note 7, s 4.
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all of the statutory requirements are met, the Commissioner is determining validity.
That is, the Commissioner is essentially determining whether, if the patent applica-
tion is granted for the patent claims as set out in the patent application, the resulting
patent would be valid.”
Counter-intuitive as it may seem, it is neither the Commissioner’s duty to de-
cide whether patent claims are valid, nor does the Act empower the Commissioner
to do so. The Commissioner’s duty is to determine whether the claims meet the
requirements of the Act for the grant of a patent. That is where the Commissioner’s
duty — and powers — end. Determining validity is, ultimately, an issue for the
courts. That is why issued claims are not per se valid, but rather have only a pre-
sumption of validity.239 At a fundamental level it is, again, the difference between
(a) a general desideratum; and (b) the rule of law.
(k) The Role of the Examiner
The FCA stated at paragraph 73: 
Anyone who undertakes a purposive construction of a patent must do so on
the basis of a foundation of knowledge about the relevant art, and in particu-
lar about the state of the relevant art at the relevant time. For the Commis-
sioner, that assistance comes in the form of submissions from the patent
applicant and, I assume, from staff at the patent office with the appropriate
experience.240
First, the FCA refers to “purposive construction of a patent” when it must
have meant purposive construction of the claims of a patent.
Second, patent examiners are persons of ordinary skill in the art of patent ex-
amining, not in the arts being examined. Examiners do not make “submissions”;
are not qualified as experts to make submissions; are not subject to cross-examina-
tion on either qualifications or knowledge as an expert; and cannot be impeached
during prosecution for lack of qualifications or knowledge as an expert.
Patent examiners have a double role. First, patent examination being ex parte,
examiners have a duty to exercise the fair-minded skepticism of a reasonable man
to protect the public from unmerited claims. That is done by ensuring compliance
with the Act. Second, they have a duty to see that the applicant is not cheated.
Systematically cheating inventors out of their rights undermines the integrity of the
public bargain of the Patent Act just as surely as allowing unmerited claims. The
second role of the examiner is quasi-judicial: to see that allowed claims are fair as
between the inventor and the public.241 It is required by law in Consolboard; it is
how progress in the useful arts is promoted; and it is also how the dignity and
239 Patent Act, s 43(2) — After the patent is issued, it shall, in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, be valid . . .
240 FCA, supra note 4.
241 According to CIPO: “The [PAB] is an advisory body made up of senior Patent Office
officials. In carrying out his duties, the Commissioner of Patents makes decisions that
are quasi-judicial in nature. Since 1970 the Board has been mandated by the Commis-
sioner to conduct independent reviews, provide recommendations and advise him when
making such quasi-judicial decisions which principally concern the review of rejected
applications, . . .” Clearly, if the Commissioner’s duty is to behave in a quasi-judicial
190   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
integrity of the Office as a public institution are maintained.
The Examiner’s duty is to be inquisitive, while being even-handed. As Pigeon
J, said: “It does not seem to me that inventors are to be looked upon as Shylock
claiming his pound of flesh”.242 The duty is that of an unbiased investigator, not a
partisan. That quasi-judicial role is inherently inconsistent with the suggestion that
examiners make “submissions”.
(l) Blurring the Statutory Provisions
A recurring problem in subject-matter cases is the mixing of unrelated issues.
Recall paragraph 38:
I do not propose to try to list all of the issues implicit in subsections 27(3), (4)
and (8) and the statutory definition of “invention” that must be considered by the
Commissioner, but it seems to me that they would include at least the following
(which need not be considered in any particular order): . . .
(a) Patentable subject-matter . . .
(b) Novelty . . .
(c) Utility . . .
(d) Obviousness . . .
(e) Statutory prohibition . . .
Patentable subject-matter is addressed in the definition of s 2; Novelty is in s
28.2(1); Utility is in the definition of invention in s 2; Obviousness is in s 28.3;
explicit statutory prohibitions are addressed in s 27(8). The suggestion that there
are “issues implicit” in each of sections 27(3), 27(4), 27(8), and in the s 2 definition
of invention smudges separate and distinct issues together and causes confusion.
The issues need to be untangled, not blurred.
VIII. A FRAMEWORK BASED ON PATENT FUNDAMENTALS
(a) Lessons from Amazon.com
One of the more important lessons from Amazon.com is to observe how the
amplitude of incremental divergence from fundamental principles of patent law can
accumulate in successive cases. Commencing from that already-off-kilter starting
point of Lawson, there is a kind of bit-by-bit accumulating serial distortion of the
law: (a) purposive construction is now to include an analysis of individual essential
elements to determine which ones fall within the categories of patent eligible sub-
ject-matter,243 contrary to the central idea of purposive construction; (b) implicitly,
manner, that duty must also apply to his appointed delegates in the examining corps
who stand in the Commissioner’s shoes during examination.
242 Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc v Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd (1974), 17 CPR (2d)
97 (SCC) per Pigeon J at 106.
243 Now referred to by CIPO as an “Inventive Concept” analysis. However, the term “in-
ventive concept” as used by CIPO should not be confused with the term “inventive
concept” as used by the USSC in, for example, Mayo v Prometheus. They have differ-
ent meanings and origins.
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a downstream decision pertaining to the definition of invention under s 2 can alter
the upstream purposive construction of the claims; (c) the invention need merely be
“grounded” in the claim, rather than “in” the claim; and (d) it is necessary for the
Commissioner to identify what the inventor really invented, apparently different
from what the inventor claimed, and apparently contrary to the Act and long-stand-
ing SCC precedent.
Further, it is said that there is no order of operations in determining whether
claims meet the requirements of the Act, notwithstanding the logic of the Act itself,
and SCC precedent. The powers and duties of the Commissioner are characterized
in a manner that seems inconsistent with the Act. The duties of an examiner are
mis-cast. Undefined “implicit” requirements are said to exist in the statutory provi-
sions of the Act. The basis of previous decisions is misread. SCC precedent is ap-
parently not followed. More still, this occurs at the invitation in the AMFL of the
chief law officer of Canada, with the willing encouragement of the Interveners.
With each turn of the wheel the wobble that originated in Lawson increases in
amplitude. Where incremental distortion is allowed to accumulate, it ultimately af-
fects the rights of tens of thousands of applicants, across all fields of technology.
The accumulated distortion ends up obscuring the basic principle that it is the right
of all Applicants to have patentability assessed on the basis of their own claims,
judged according to law.
(b) Rejecting Old Misconceptions
Perhaps it might be a start to recognise previous false paths for what they
were.
(I) There is no basis in the Canadian Patent Act for a “physicality” require-
ment. There is a long-established requirement for “practicality”. A better approach
is to ask, as did the SCC in R v Uhlemann Optical Co, and the USSC in Mayo
Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, if the claimed combination
is a mere aggregation, or if something about it makes it more than merely the sum
of its parts.
The requirement for “physicality” in the FCA reasons in Amazon.com would
render the claimed Armstrong, Rantzen, Morse, and Chatfield subject-matter non-
statutory. An approach perhaps more consistent with precedent and fundamental
patent principles is that an inventive act must have a non-purely-mental component
that presents itself in objective evidence observable by (i.e., apparent to the senses
of) persons of ordinary skill. The proposition that the existence of patent-eligible
subject-matter cannot be premised on software or business method steps, alone, for
lack of physicality, but is to be found by a piece-meal analysis of elements deemed
essential to the claim is inconsistent with purposive construction. By contrast, the
approach, as in Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, and
in Wright v Brake Service Ltd as affirmed by the SCC, making a “greater than the
sum of the parts” analysis of the claim as a whole (i) is consistent with purposive
construction; (ii) does not rely on an artificial physicality requirement that would
have excluded electronic signal inventions; and (iii) is consistent with earlier SCC
precedent.
(II) It is important to stop confusing the patent eligibility of subject-matter
with other issues. The decisions in Schlumberger and Amazon.com both involved
rejections that were perhaps not the rejections that might have been made. Issues of
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patent-eligible subject-matter were confused, and inter-mixed with, issues of obvi-
ousness. Whether the claim is for an act having mental and non-purely-mental com-
ponents is unrelated to whether it (a) falls within science and the useful arts, and if
so, one of the statutory classes; (b) is new; (c) has utility; or (d) is obvious. Those
are each separate and independent issues.
(III) There is no basis in law for rejecting a claim for the sole reason that it is a
method implemented by a computer, or because the method is expressed in the
form of software. Likewise, there is no basis in law for rejecting a claim merely by
calling it “an algorithm”, whether implemented by computer or otherwise. “Al-
gorithm” is just another word for “method”.
(IV) Stretching the word “abstract” to cover things that are not abstract at all is
not helpful. The Office and the Courts already appear to apply a “science and the
useful arts” standard, even when they do not articulate it well, or apply it in the
guise of something else.244 As Stevens J observed, the elastic reliance on finding
claims “abstract” when the issue is really that they are not within the “useful arts”
is an exercise that leads to absurd and arbitrary results.
(V) There is no clear definition of “business method” in either Canadian or US
law by which to distinguish “business methods” from ordinary methods. Whether
explicitly or implicitly, the exclusion of the older “methods of doing business”
arises because they are neither “science” nor “the useful arts”, a pattern seen in the
cases. If those methods require the exercise of human judgement or skill, they also
fail for lacking a repeatable completed inventive act supported by a fully enabling
disclosure. It would be better to cease using the term “business method”; and to
ask, instead, whether the claim falls within the “useful arts”. It is no more difficult
to define “useful art” than “business method”, and, by contrast, “useful arts” has a
basis in the fundamental principles, statutory provisions, and history of the Patent
Act.
(c) Abiding by the Rule of Law
The root problem in the Amazon.com case arose from a change in the ap-
proach of the Office to “business methods”. That change in approach appears to
have led to the effort to promote adoption of the Aerotel245 four-step approach de-
scribed in the PAB and FC reasons — a process originating in the EPC, and with-
out a basis in Canadian law. It may be that rejections might have been raised under
s 27(8); it may be that greater effort might have been made to find prior art upon
which to advance rejections on the basis of anticipation or obviousness. Whatever
the case, it was neither appropriate to disregard the law, nor to alter the law on the
basis of in terrorem arguments of a third party Intervener. The Patent Act creates a
rules-based system. It is premised on the Rule of Law. It cannot function properly
otherwise.
244 See the cases listed in s 8(e) herein. Courts have applied implicit “useful arts” tests for
a long time.
245 Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd, [2006] EWCA Civ 1371.
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(d) The Interveners’ Alternative: Prohibition by Technological Field
The alternative preferred by the Interveners was that neither business methods
nor computer software should, by itself, be patentable. This result is largely ob-
tained in the FCA reasons in Amazon.com. Even if there were support under s 2 for
such an exclusion, it needs to be seen in the context of our economy.
According to the FCA in Amazon.com, the output of what is now, but was not
in the time of Schlumberger, less still Lawson, a significant portion of our economy
is to be excluded from the principal arm of government related to the advance of
commerce and industry. The FCA considers the work-product of these software
and systems engineers to be nothing more than abstract theorems and scientific
principles, and the Patent Office considers their work not to be scientific or techno-
logical. There is no other branch of Engineering, i.e., of applied science, that is
systemically or categorically to be excluded from the statutory regime established
by the Patent Act.
The effect of Amazon.com is to exclude software from the patent regime. The
purpose of the patent system is to encourage the disclosure of advances in science
and the useful arts. The addition to the store of knowledge then acts as a stepping-
stone prompting further advances. The objective of the Patent Act is not to reward
inventors. It is to promote the sharing of knowledge in the useful arts and sciences,
and thereby to spur economic advance.
Some would prefer to see computer programming, i.e., “software”, as merely
“mathematical formulae”, even as in our times the software industry has had a
transformative effect on society. It is everywhere about us — unavoidably, and in
broad daylight. There is hardly an aspect of our society or our lives that has not
been transformed.
Over the long term, rises in productivity depend on technological innovation.
The Patent Office is the arm of industry, trade and commerce, that deals with tech-
nological advance — what was once called progress in science and the useful arts.
Yet there are those who would exclude from the purview of the Patent Act one of
the most transformative fields of technology of our times. Thus, in the Patent Of-
fice, and apparently now in the FCA, software is the technology that dare not speak
its name.
How can that possibly make sense?
(e) Return to Patent Fundamentals — The Logical Order of Inquiry
Perhaps there is a better approach, based on patent fundamentals. There is a
logical hierarchy, or order, to the inquiries required to establish patentability. On
the assumption that the Applicant is the person entitled to seek protection for the
subject-matter of the claims:
1. The first step is that the claims must be purposively construed to ascer-
tain their meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
(a) Does the claim have a clear meaning to a person of ordinary skill in
the art having a mind willing to understand?
(b) Is the subject-matter of the claims, according to that clear meaning,
both disclosed and enabled by the specification as filed on the claimed
priority date as required by s 27(3) of the Patent Act?
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(c) Is the interpretation fair as between the inventor and the public?246
2. As purposively construed, is the claimed invention:
(i) more than merely an idea that floated through the inventor’s
brain, i.e., more than a purely mental idea?
(ii) more than a mere aggregation of parts?
(iii) an idea or conception; and a practical way of realizing the
idea?
(iv) directed toward something greater than the sum of the
parts?
(a) If there is no mental portion, even if there is a physical embodiment,
there can be no invention. A mere aggregation is unpatentable. The
mental portion need only be very slight.
(b) If there is no non-purely-mental, practical portion, or if the claim is to
an end, rather than to a practical means to achieve an end, or if the claim
depends upon the exercise of human judgment or skill,247 then there is no
invention, and all that has been done is to arrive at a mental process.
Instructions to perform mathematical calculations are purely mental
processes.
3. If there has been an act of invention:
(a) Does the claimed invention fall within “science and the useful arts”?
Activity within neither science nor the useful arts cannot be statutory.
(b) Does the invention fit in one of the statutory class divisions? I.e., is it
a useful art, a process, a machine, or a composition of matter, or an im-
provement of any one of them?
(i) Does the invention pertain to an instrument (i.e., an appara-
tus, a combination, a machine, a device, a manufacture, a com-
position of matter, or a product-by-process) whose existence is
objective evidence of invention?
(ii) If not, and the invention pertains to operations (e.g., a pro-
cess, a method, a list of steps, an algorithm, or a use), then is
there practical evidence that it is not purely mental, but is per-
ceptible to the senses?
Demonstration of a physical transformation of matter is a suffi-
cient, though not necessary, condition to meet this test.
(c) A non-exhaustive list of examples of non-statutory arts248 includes:
The fine arts, such as methods of playing musical instruments;
executing sculptures, drawings, portraiture; theatrical
presentation;
246 Consolboard, supra note 11.
247 In re Comiskey, supra note 15.
248 The cases are from Canada, US, UK, Australia and NZ case law, collectively. A gen-
eral theme shines through.
MISADVENTURES ON PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT-MATTER   195
Literary compositions249
Methods of practicing a profession,250 such as
Methods of surveying land251
Plans of architecture252
Methods of practicing law253
Methods of drafting patent specifications254
Schemes or plans for conducting a business255, 256, 257
Plans for becoming rich258
A plan for the better government of a State259
A plan for the efficient conduct of business260
A plan for cooperative trading261
A plan for securing the payment of a discount262
Methods involving book-keeping or financial transactions:
Methods of accounting and book-keeping263, 264
Methods of conducting an auction265
249 Cooper’s Application (1902), 19 RPC 53 at 54 (AG). Oddly, Cooper’s invention was
mechanical and functional, and the case was probably decided on the wrong ground.
The English “printed forms” cases may be treated with caution since they turn on
“vendible manufactures”. For example, Application of Kelvin & Hughes Ltds (1954),
71 RPC 103, rejecting claims for aircraft navigational chart, may be doubted.
250 See Shell Oil, supra note 28, and also NRDC, supra note 65.
251 Lawson, supra note 61.
252 ESP’s Application, Re (1945), 62 RPC 87.
253 NRDC, supra note 65: “. . . the skill of a solicitor and conveyancer”.
254 A fundamental self-evident truth.
255 In re Wait, 73 F 2d 982 (1934) [Wait].
256 Loew’s Drive-In Theatres v Park-In Theatres, 174 F 2d 547 [Drive-In Theatres]
257 Application of Maucorps, 609 F 2d 481 (1979) Computer program model of sales
organization.
258 Cooper’s Application (1902), 19 RPC 53 at 54 (AG). One might also expect problems






263 Hotel Security Checking Co v Lorraine Co, 160 F 467 (2d Cir, 1908).
264 Ex Parte Murray, 9 USQ2d 1819 (PTO Bd Pat App, 1988); Dann v Johnston, 425 US
219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976) (ostensibly decided on 35 USC 103 grounds); In re Patton,
127 F 2d 324 at 327, 53 USPQ 376 at 379 (Cust & Pat App, 1942).
265 In re Schrader, 22 F 3d 290, 30 USPQ2d 1455 (Fed Cir 1994).
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Methods of buying and selling securities266
Methods of hedging risks in commodities trading267
Calculating values of holdings in an investment
portfolio268
A personal financial management system269
Methods of tax planning270
Methods of making checks on credit applications271
Method of detecting fraud in a credit card
transaction272
Methods of medical treatment273
Arrangement of information on a chart274
Methods of taste testing beverages275
4. If otherwise statutory, is it subject to an explicit exclusion under s
27(8)?
(a) Is it merely an abstract idea?
(b) Is it merely a scientific principle?
5. Is the invention new, i.e., is it novel under s 28.2 of the Patent Act?
6. Is the invention obvious, i.e., even if it is subjectively creative to the
inventor, does it meet the requirements of section 28.3 of the Patent Act?
7. If there is statutory subject-matter that has not been excluded, then
does that subject-matter have utility?
This logic separates the grounds of rejection that have frequently been con-
fused, and it does so on the basis of the statute and the sound patent fundamentals
266 Wait, supra note 255.
267 Bilski, supra note 3.
268 Fogo, Re (1983), 2 CPR (3d) 483 (Can Pat App Bd & Pat Commr) at 487. The PAB
struggles for pages to deny the obvious: it was a financial system for valuing portfolios,
and therefore not a useful art.
269 Patent Application No 564,175, Re (1999), 6 CPR (4th) 385 (Can Pat App Bd & Pat
Commr).
270 Fort Properties v American Master Lease (Fed Cir 2012): “A method of creating a real
estate investment instrument adapted for performing tax-deferred exchanges, compris-
ing: . . .” The grant (US 6,292,788) raises substantial concerns about quality of
examination.
271 Dealertrack v Huber (Fed Cir 2012) US 7,587,841 and US 7,181,427. Quality of
examination?
272 Cybersource v Retail Decisions (Fed Cir 2011) US 6,029,154. Quality of Examination?
273 In re Meyer, 688 F 2d 789 (1982) Method of giving neurological examination; how-
ever, a use for a medicine, for example, can be claimed in Canada, and a use may
sometimes yield broader protection than a method.
274 Application of Kelvin & Hughes (1953), 71 RPC 103.
275 Joseph E Seagram v Marzall, 180 F 2d 26 (1950).
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underlying the statute.
IX. CONCLUDING COMMENTARY — THE MISSED
OPPORTUNITY
Determination of the boundaries of patent-eligible subject-matter is an area
where the law has diverged from the needs of the economy. It has needed an un-
ravelling of the skein of confusion between issues of obviousness and issues of
statutory subject-matter for nearly half a century. The profession has been waiting
fifteen years for a suitable case on communications technology to reach the Su-
preme Court. Amazon.com should have been that opportunity.
There was an opportunity to present a case based on the history of the Patent
Act, and on provisions still extant in the Patent Act that require that patents be
granted only for subject-matter pertaining to science and the useful arts. It was an
opportunity to sweep aside the errors of the past, and, instead, to put determination
of statutory subject-matter back on a sound footing based on the fundamental prin-
ciples of patent law that have served well for two centuries.
The outcome in Amazon.com is doubly unfortunate. First, the FCA reasons do
not aid in untangling the existing muddle. Second, the lack of an appeal to the SCC
can only be seen as a disappointment. Cases on patent-eligible subject-matter rarely
reach the SCC. It may be many years before that happens. A rare opportunity has
been lost.
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Appendix 
1. The Claim in Lawson
1. In the art of municipal development the improvement which consists in a
subdivided parcel of building land comprising a plurality of individual building lots
each of which is of at least a minimum predetermined area and has at least a mini-
mum access frontage, said parcel being defined by metes and bounds including an
access frontage line running along at least the length of one side of said parcel, and
a rear line running along the other side of said parcel, a substantial proportion of
the total number of said lots extending between the frontage line and the rear line,
each lot of said substantial proportion having a major frontage and a minor front-
age, the said major and minor frontages alternately coinciding with said frontage
line and said rear line, the side lines of said lots extending between the ends of said
major and minor frontages whereby to provide building sites on said lots which are
of variable depth from said frontage line.
5. A subdivided parcel of land as defined in claim 1 wherein the side lines of
said substantial proportion of said lots are circular, the portions of the side lines
intersecting the major frontage of a lot springing from a point substantially on the
centerline of said lot, the portions of side lines intersecting the minor frontage of
said lot springing from points on the centerlines of lots on either side of said lot, the
circles defining a given side line having a point of conjunction in the region of the
median of the depth of said lot, and a common tangent at said point of conjunction,
whereby the side lines are generally “S” shaped, and said lot has the general config-
uration of a champagne glass.
2. Armstrong’s FM Signal Patent — Canadian Patent 218,281
Armstrong’s patent has a total of 9 independent claims. None of the claims
recites any physical component. The corresponding US patents, including US
1,342,885, were the subject of litigation lasting more than 20 years.
1. The method of amplifying and receiving high frequency electrical os-
cillatory energy which comprises, combining the incoming energy with
locally generated high frequency continuous oscillations of a frequency
differing from said incoming energy by a third readily-amplifiable high
frequency, converting the combined energy by suitable means to produce
said readily-amplifiable high frequency oscillations, and detecting and in-
dicating the resulting amplified oscillations.
2. The method of amplifying and receiving high frequency electrical os-
cillatory energy which comprises, combining the incoming energy with
locally generated high frequency continuous electrical oscillations of a
frequency differing from said incoming energy by a third readily-amplifi-
able high frequency, rectifying the combined energy to produce said
readily-amplifiable high frequency oscillations, amplifying the said third
high frequency oscillations, and detecting and indicating the resulting
amplified oscillations.
3. The method of amplifying and receiving high frequency damped wave
oscillatory electrical energy which comprises, combining the incoming
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energy with locally generated high frequency continuous electrical oscil-
lations of a frequency differing from said incoming energy by a third
readily amplifiable high frequency, converting the combined energy by
suitable means to produce said readily-amplifiable high frequency oscil-
lations, amplifying the said third high frequency oscillations and de-
tecting and indicating the resulting amplified oscillations.
7. The method of receiving and amplifying high frequency oscillations
whereby the incoming energy is utilized to produce oscillations of a dif-
ferent locally predetermined high frequency which are then amplified and
the resultant energy utilized to produce oscillations of a second different,
locally predetermined, high frequency, which are then amplified, de-
tected, and indicated.
3. Rantzen’s Case: GB 587,447 issued 25 April 1947
The claims in the English case Rantzen’s Application, Re (1947), 64 RPC 63:
1. “Method of transmitting simultaneously over an electrical communica-
tion system a main signal having a relatively wide frequency range and a
subsidiary signal in a relatively narrow range of low frequencies, which
method consists in removing from the main signal of wide frequency
range the components in a relatively narrow frequency band, preferably
so placed in the frequency spectrum that its absence has a minimum audi-
ble effect on the main signal, transmitting over a common communica-
tion channel the remaining frequency components of the main signal si-
multaneously with a tone having a frequency within said frequency band,
said tone being modulated with the subsidiary low-frequency signal and
being maintained at a level so low that it is practically inaudible in the
received signals, and reading said subsidiary low-frequency signal by ap-
plying the received signals to a receiver having a selective amplifier
tuned to said tone.”
6. Apparatus for transmitting simultaneously over an electrical communi-
cations system a complex oscillation consisting of a main signal having a
relatively wide frequency range and a subsidiary signal of one or more
low frequencies, the apparatus including at a transmitter means for re-
moving from the main signal the components in a relatively narrow fre-
quency band, means for generating a tone having a frequency within said
band, means for modulating said tone with said subsidiary signal, means
for mixing the remaining frequency components of the main signal with
the modulated tone to produce a combined oscillation and for maintain-
ing the tone at a relatively low level, and a receiver adapted to be fed
with said combined oscillation a selective amplifier tuned to said tone,
and means for broadcasting, converting into sound or recording the com-
bined oscillation in the form in which it was received, the arrangement
being such that the said level of the tone is so low that the subsidiary
signal is practically inaudible when the combined oscillation is converted
into sound.
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4. US RE 117 of Morse, claim 5:
5. The system of signs consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots, spaces, and
horizontal lines for numerals, letters, words or sentences, substantially as herein set
forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes.
5. Chatfield
1. A method of operating a computing system upon more than one processing
program concurrently for improving total resource utilization, said computing sys-
tem comprising at least one central processing unit, having a logic and main mem-
ory function and an interrupt capability, and a plurality of peripheral resources ca-
pable of functioning in parallel with the central processing unit, comprising steps
for:
(1) accumulating system utilization data for at least one processing pro-
gram for at least one resource, said system utilization data comprising
resource activity and/or resource degradation data;
(2)(a) at spaced intervals interrupting the processing programs and ana-
lyzing the system utilization of at least one processing program;
(2)(b) based on this analysis regulating resource access by assigning an
individual resource access priority and/or preventing resource access al-
together in an unlike manner to at least two resources for at least one
processing program to increase thruput;
(3) resuming the operation of the computing systems on the processing
programs; and,
(4) continually repeating steps (1) to (3).
2. A method according to Claim 1 in which the regulation in step (2)(b) com-
prises regulating resource access substantially to favor the more overlapped pro-
grams, said overlapped programs being those that can use two or more resources in
parallel.
6. The Claims in Schlumberger
Claim 1 as prosecuted:
1. A machine operated method of processing well logging data,
comprising:
(a) deriving a plurality of measurements representative of char-
acteristics of an earth formation at selected depth levels over a
section of a borehole;
(b) machine combining at least some of said derived measure-
ments from at least some of said selected depth levels over said
borehole section to compute at least one input parameter for
said borehole section;
(c) machine combining at least some of said plurality of de-
rived measurements from at least some of said selected depth
levels with at least one input parameter to compute at least one
output parameter for at least some of said selected depth levels;
and
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(d) machine combining at least some of said derived measure-
ments with said at least one output parameter for at least some
of said selected depth levels to recompute said at least one in-
put parameter or compute another input parameter for combina-
tion with at least some of said plurality of measurements to pro-
duce output parameters representative of at least one formation
characteristic.
Later, during prosecution, Schlumberger submitted the following claim:
46. Apparatus for processing well logging data to determine characteris-
tic properties of earth formations, comprising:
(a) means for deriving a plurality of measurements representa-
tive of characteristics of an earth formation at selected depth
levels over a section of a borehole;
(b) a data processing unit; and
(c) means adapted to control said data processing unit for com-
bining at least some of said derived measurements from at least
some of said selected depth levels over said borehole section to
compute at least one input parameter for said borehole section,
combining at least some of said plurality of derived measure-
ments from at least some of said selected depth levels with said
at least one input parameter to compute at least one output pa-
rameter for at least some of said selected depth levels, and
combining at least some of said derived measurements with
said at least one output parameter for at least some of said se-
lected depth levels to recompute said at least one input parame-
ter or compute another input parameter for combination with at
least some of said plurality of measurements to produce output
parameters representative of at least one formation
characteristic.
7. The Claim in Shell Oil
1. A plant growth regulant composition comprising a compound of the
formula
X — CH2 CH2-S-A wherein X represents chlorine, broine, iodine, hydroxy,
alkoxy of up to 3 carbon atoms, aryloxy of up to 10 carbon atoms, alkylthio of up
to 3 carbon atoms, aralkoxy of up to 10 carbon atoms, acyloxy of up to 4 carbon
atoms, alkylsuplhonyloxy wherein the alkyl group contains up to 3 carbon atoms,
arylsulphonyloxy, nitro monalkylamino or dialkylamino wherein each alkyl group
contains up to 6 carbon atoms, or A’R’ wherein A’ is oxygen and R’ is 2-
(dimethylcarbamoyl)-1-methylvinyl, 2-(methylcarbamoyl)-1-methylvinyl or 2-
(methoxy-carbonyl)-1-methylvinyl; and either A represents the group — Y-R
wherein
Y is oxygen or sulphur with the proviso that when Y is oxygen R is alkyl of up
to 20 carbon atoms, aryl of up to 10 carbon atoms, alkenyl of up to 8 carbon atoms,
alkynl of up to 4 carbon atoms, 2-(dimethylcarbamoyl)-1-methylvinyl, 2-(methyl-
carbamoly)-1-methylvinyl, 2-(methoxycarbonyl)-1-methylvinyl or ZR2 wherein z is
alkylene of up to 4 carbon atoms and R2 is alkylthio of up to 3 carbon atoms,
202   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [10 C.J.L.T.]
alkoxy of up to 4 carbon atoms, aralkoxy of up to 10 carbon atoms, hydroxy, or
beta substituted ethane-sulphinyloxy moiety wherein the beta substituent is identi-
cal to the beta substituent represented by X in formula I above; and when Y is
sulphur R is alkyl of up to 8 carbon atoms optionally substituted with chlorine or
bromine, or aralkyl wherein the alkyl group contains up to 4 carbon atoms; and R
may also represent hydrogen, if Y is oxygen and X is any of the moieties repre-
sented by X above except A’R’; or
A represents the group — N< R3/R4 wherein R3 and R4 may be the same or
different and each represents hydrogen, alkyl of up to 20 carbon atoms or aralkyl of
up to 10 carbon atoms; either or both of R3 and R4 may be R5Y’ wherein R5 is
alkylene of up to 4 carbon atoms and Y’ is hydroxy or betaloethanesulphinyloxy
wherein the beta halogen substitutent is chlorine, bromine, or iodine with the pro-
viso that when Y’ is hydroxy X represents any of the moieties described for X
above except A’R’ and when Y’ is a betaloethane sulphinyloxy X is chlorine, bro-
mine or iodine; if R3 is hydrogen R4 may also represent aryl of up to 10 carbon
atoms, alkenyl of up to 8 carbon atoms, cycloalkyl of up to 8 carbon atoms, R5Y2
wherein R5 is as described above and Y2 is alkylthio of up to 3 carbon atoms,
alkoxy of up to 4 carbon atoms; when R3 is hydrogen and R4 may also represent a
substituted phenyl of the formula
[Hexagon form with three double-bonds labelled Z’] wherein Z’ is alkyl of up
to 3 carbon atoms, alkythio of up to 3 carbon atoms, alkoxy of up to 3 carbon
atoms, alkylsuphonyl of up to 3 carbon atoms, chlorine, bromine, nitro or
trifluoromethyl; and if R3 is hydrogen alkyl or aryl R4 may also represent hydroxy
or alkoxy of up to 4 carbon atoms;
together with an adjuvant therefor.
8. Claims 1 and 13 of Canadian Application 506,848 of Progressive Games Inc.
1. A method of playing a poker game comprising the steps of:
(a) a player anteing a first bet means,
(b) a dealer dealing a hand comprising a predetermined number of cards
to each of the player and dealer,
(c) the player either folding in which case the player loses his first bet
means to the dealer, or betting a second bet means,
(d) the player comparing his hand to the hand of the dealer using poker
rank as the criterion for comparison,
(e) if the dealer’s hand is not at least a predetermined rank, the player
wins a preselected amount based on the player’s first bet means and the
player keeps his second bet means,
(f) if the dealer’s hand is at least a predetermined rank, and the dealer’s
hand is higher than the player’s hand, the player loses both his first bet
means and his second bet means,
(g) if the dealer’s hand is at least a predetermined rank, and the player’s
hand is higher than the dealer’s hand, then the player wins a first prede-
termined amount on his first bet means and the player wins a second pre-
determined amount on his second bet means based on the type of poker
hand combination that the player has, said second predetermined amount
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having a potential return of at least twenty times the amount of the sec-
ond bet means.
13. The method of claim 1 wherein the second predetermined amount that a








Three of a Kind 3-to-1
Two pair 2-to-1
Any other hand 1-to-1.
9. The Claims in Amazon.com
1. A method in a client system for ordering an item, the method comprising:
receiving from a server system a client identifier of the client system;
persistently storing the client identifier at the client system;
when an item is to be ordered,
displaying information identifying the item and displaying an indication
of a single action that is to be performed to order the identified item; and
in response to a single action being performed, sending to the server sys-
tem a request to order the identified item along with the client identifier,
the client identifier identifying account information previously supplied
by a user of the client system when ordering the item; and
when account information is to be changed,
coordinating the log in of the user to the server system;
receiving updated account information; and
sending the updated account information to the server system,
whereby the user does not need to log in the server system when ordering
the item, but needs to log in to the server system when changing previ-
ously supplied account information.
44. A client system for ordering an item, comprising:
a component that receives from a server system a client identifier of the
client system and that stores the client identifier persistently;
a component that orders an item by displaying information identifying
the item along with an indication of a single action that is to be per-
formed to order the identified item and by sending to the server system a
request to order the identified item along with the client identifier, the
client identifier identifying account information previously supplied by a
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user wherein the user does not need to log in to the server system when
ordering the item; and
a component that updates account information by coordinating the log in
of the user to the server system, receiving updated account information
from the user, and sending the updated account information to the server
system. 
